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 First Amendment “Harms” 
STEPHANIE H. BARCLAY* 
What role should harm to third parties play in the government’s ability to protect 
religious rights? The intuitively appealing “harm” principle has animated new 
theories advanced by scholars who argue that religious exemptions are indefensible 
whenever they result in cognizable harm to third parties. This third-party harm 
theory is gaining traction in some circles, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s 
pending cases in Little Sisters of the Poor and Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. While 
focusing on harm appears at first to provide an appealing, simple, and neutral 
principle for avoiding other difficult moral questions, the definition of harm itself 
operates on top of a deep moral theory about what counts as harm and why. 
Consequently, multiple scholars advancing iterations of these theories use “harm” 
as a term of art to mean very different things. This in turn results in scholars talking 
past each other and trading on a superficially simple idea that turns out to be 
incredibly complex. For this reason, the harm principle has proven unworkable in 
other contexts, including criminal and environmental law. This Article highlights the 
flaws of this approach in the religious context by measuring the theory against its 
own ends, including the theory’s failure to account for harms this approach would 
cause for religious minorities and other vulnerable groups. 
Refuting the unhelpful fixation on the mere presence of generic harm, this Article 
makes two important contributions, one descriptive and one normative. First, this 
Article carefully describes the nuanced ways that courts classify and weigh different 
types of harm, and it identifies three categories: (1) prohibited harms (meaning 
harms that are categorically impermissible); (2) probative harms (meaning relevant 
harms that can be balanced against other harms); and (3) inadmissible harms 
(meaning harms that are given no weight regardless of how severely or 
disproportionately they are experienced by third parties). This Article demonstrates 
how these categories of harm are not limited to religious exemptions but are in fact 
common to all First Amendment rights. Further, this descriptive framework 
highlights the competing harms that always arise when First Amendment rights are 
protected. Second, this Article argues that moving beyond a false dichotomy of harm 
versus no harm allows one to ask much more fruitful normative questions, including 
whether there is a justifiable tradeoff between the specific harm and the social goods 
it provides, whether institutions can be modified to mitigate avoidable harm, and 
whether disproportionate harms can be distributed in more just ways. This Article 
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offers examples of how these necessary normative questions are already woven into 
the legal framework that governs many sorts of religious exemptions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
David Rasheed Ali is an observant Muslim and a prison inmate who requested an 
exemption from the prison’s restrictive policies that prohibited him from wearing a 
kufi, a knit skullcap, as required by his religious beliefs.1 One might be tempted to 
conclude that wearing a kufi is both harmless and costless, making the decision to 
grant a religious exemption relatively straightforward. But even something as 
seemingly innocuous as religious head coverings contains a number of hidden 
 
 
 1. Ali v. Stephens, 822 F.3d 776, 781 (5th Cir. 2016). 
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potential costs and harms, including allegations of hundreds of thousands of dollars 
in estimated redistributed staff time and resources to implement a new policy;2 less 
resources for other inmates for better healthcare, activities, facilities, or food;3 
heightened physical risk for prison guards who must enter an inmate’s “strike zone” 
to search personal items; and increased risk of deadly contraband being secreted in a 
headwear hiding spot.4 On the other hand, failing to grant an exemption causes 
spiritual and dignitary harm to Ali, who must violate his conscience. And numerous 
studies suggest that providing religious protections for inmates decreases prison 
violence and results in significant rehabilitative positive externalities—not just for 
other inmates and security guards, but for society at large.5 In light of these 
competing and varied externalities, how should we think about Ali’s religious 
exemption request? 
These sorts of questions about harm related to religious exemptions are 
particularly weighty at this moment in American history, when religious exemptions 
have perhaps never been more controversial or hotly debated in legal scholarship.6 
Particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s previous cases like Hobby Lobby7 and 
Masterpiece Cakeshop,8 as well as its upcoming case regarding exemptions for the 
Little Sisters of the Poor and Catholic adoption agencies,9 some scholars have 
 
 
 2. Id. at 796 (discussing the prison’s estimate of $702,500 in annual costs across the 
prison to implement a new policy allowing inmate use of headgear and implementing 
necessary safety precautions).  
 3. See, e.g., Appellants’ Initial Brief at 36, 38, United States v. Sec’y, Fla. Dept. of Corr., 
828 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-14117) (arguing that costs related to providing a 
kosher dietary accommodation would result in less funding for “roofs for prisons, mental 
health and medical care for inmates, and salaries for security staff,” and that less resources 
could even compromise the “security and safety of the institutions”). 
 4. Ali, 822 F.3d at 788, 794; Cox v. Stephens, No. 2:13-CV-151, 2015 WL 1417033, at 
*7, *9 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2015) (discussing the strike zone).  
 5. See Todd R. Clear & Melvina T. Sumter, Prisoners, Prison, and Religion: Religion 
and Adjustment to Prison, 35 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 125, 147–152 (2002); Byron R. 
Johnson, David B. Larson & Timothy C. Pitts, Religious Programs, Institutional Adjustment, 
and Recidivism Among Former Inmates in Prison Fellowship Programs, 14 JUST. Q. 145, 148, 
160–63 (1997) (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter Johnson et al., Religious Programs]; 
Thomas P. O’Connor & Michael Perreyclear, Prison Religion in Action and Its Influence on 
Offender Rehabilitation, 35 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 11, 27–30 (2002); see also Todd R. 
Clear & Marina Myhre, A Study of Religion in Prison, 6 INT’L ASS’N RESIDENTIAL & 
COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVES J. ON COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 20, 24–25 (1995); Byron R. 
Johnson, Religiosity and Institutional Deviance: The Impact of Religious Variables upon 
Inmate Adjustment, 12 CRIM. JUST. REV. 21, 24–25 (1987); Byron R. Johnson, Spencer De Li, 
David B. Larson & Michael McCullough, A Systematic Review of the Religiosity and 
Delinquency Literature: A Research Note, 16 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 32 41–46 (2000). 
[hereinafter Johnson et al., Systematic Review]. 
 6. See Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 167–72 (2014) 
(discussing the heightened polarization regarding religious exemption debates). 
 7. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
 8. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 9. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, SCOTUSBLOG, 
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/little-sisters-of-the-poor-saints-peter-and-paul 
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advanced new theories that would place strict limits on the government’s ability to 
grant religious exemptions that result in harm to third parties who do not benefit from 
that religious practice.10 These theories have inspired recent legislation, including the 
2018 Do No Harm Act,11 and are gaining traction among some judges.12 
Iterations of this theory, referred to in this Article as the “third-party harm theory,” 
rely on both descriptive and normative claims. Descriptively, the theory asserts that 
Supreme Court cases are best understood as categorically prohibiting religious 
exemptions that result in cognizable harm to third parties. Normatively, third-party 
theorists such as Professors Schwartzman, Tebbe, and Schragger make the claim that 
it is “disturbing” to “forc[e] third parties to pay for the exercise of . . . [religious] 
rights” of other parties.13  
 
 
-home-v-pennsylvania/ [https://perma.cc/J7H8-6K8D] (Supreme Court granted cert on 
January 17, 2020); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, SCOTUSBLOG, 
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/fulton-v-city-of-philadelphia-pennsylvania/ 
[https://perma.cc/2GRX-49UD] (Supreme Court granted cert on February 24, 2020). 
 10. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, Of Burdens and Baselines: 
Hobby Lobby’s Puzzling Footnote 37, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 323 
(Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë Robinson eds., 2016) [hereinafter Gedicks & Van 
Tassell, Of Burdens and Baselines]; IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR 
GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 236 (2014) (discussing the “Establishment Clause problem 
under Caldor of absolutely preferring religious interests to competing secular interests, and 
doing so at the expense of private third parties”); Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience 
Wars in Transnational Perspective: Religious Liberty, Third-Party Harm, and Pluralism, in 
THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND 
EQUALITY 187, 190 (Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2018) [hereinafter NeJaime 
& Siegel, Conscience Wars]; Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, How 
Much May Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN 
THE UNITED STATES 215, 215–29 (Holly Fernandez Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen & Elizabeth Sepper 
eds., 2017) [hereinafter Tebbe et al., How Much May Accommodations Burden Others]; 
NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 49–70 (2017); Nelson Tebbe, 
Micah Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, When Do Religious Accommodations Burden 
Others?, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, 
IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY 328, 328–46 (Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2018) 
[hereinafter Tebbe et al., When Do Accommodations Burden Others]; Frederick Mark Gedicks 
& Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An 
Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 343 
(2014) [hereinafter Gedicks & Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions]; Andrew Koppelman & 
Frederick M. Gedicks, Is Hobby Lobby Worse for Religious Liberty than Smith?, 9 U. ST. 
THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223 (2015); Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Religious 
Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 128 YALE L.J.F. 201, 204–
05 (2018) [hereinafter NeJaime & Siegel, Religious Exemptions]; Micah Schwartzman, 
Nelson Tebbe & Richard Schragger, The Costs of Conscience, 106 KY. L.J. 881 (2018).  
 11. Do No Harm Act, S. 2918, 115th Cong. (2018); see also Do No Harm 
Act, HRC, https://www.hrc.org/resources/do-no-harm-act [https://perma.cc/V4SH-3RZB]; 
Hailey Lobb, The Do No Harm Act Will Make Sure Doctors and Businesses Do Just 
That, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (May 24, 2018), https://nwlc.org/blog/the-do-no-harm-act-
will-make-sure-doctors-and-businesses-do-just-that/ [https://perma.cc/X7RW-N8N8]. 
 12. See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 13. Schwartzman et al., supra note 10, at 912.  
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Many thoughtful scholars have critiqued various aspects of the third-party harm 
theory, including its constitutional grounding,14 historical foundations,15 baseline 
assumptions,16 and its impact on other accommodations.17 But what has not received 
attention in the literature is a theoretical critique of the generic harm principle on 
which the theory relies—particularly when harm is used as a sufficient, rather than 
just a necessary, condition justifying government restriction of religious rights. 
Specifically, proponents of the third-party harm theory echo longstanding views—
articulated long ago by John Stuart Mill—that the ability of individuals to exercise 
their religious rights depends on whether such liberty does not cause “harm to 
others.”18 Third-party harm theorists take this harm principle a step further. Whereas 
Mill argued that harm was a necessary, though not always sufficient, condition 
justifying government interference with individual liberty, third-party harm theorists 
 
 
 14. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER 103 (2015) [hereinafter Berg, Accommodation]; Thomas C. Berg, Religious 
Exemptions and Third-Party Harms, 17 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 50 (2016); Marc O. 
DeGirolami, Free Exercise by Moonlight, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 132–34 (2016); Carl H. 
Esbeck, When Religious Exemptions Cause Third-Party Harms: Is the Establishment Clause 
Violated? 59 J. CHURCH & ST. 357 (2016); Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, 
Establishment, and Freedom of Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39, 45 (2014). 
 15. See Berg, Accommodation, supra note 14, at 144–45; Christopher C. Lund, Religious 
Exemptions, Third-Party Harms, and the False Analogy to Church Taxes, 106 KY. L.J. 679 
(2017); Mark Storslee, Religious Accommodations, the Establishment Clause, and Third-
Party Harm, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (2019).  
 16. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 14, at 46–47 (“The argument that an exemption for 
Hobby Lobby and other employers would violate the Establishment Clause takes as the 
relevant starting point, or baseline, the requirement that employers provide employees with 
no-cost-sharing contraception coverage and employees' entitlement to that coverage. . . . The 
argument is also strange because it allows the regulation that imposes the unnecessary and 
therefore unlawful burden on religious exercise to create entitlements or interests that then 
block the ability of a court to lift that unlawful burden through an exemption.”); Marc 
DeGirolami, On the Claim that Exemptions from the Mandate Violate the Establishment 
Clause, MIRROR OF JUST. (Dec. 5, 2013), https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice 
/2013/12/exemptions-from-the-mandate-do-not-violate-the-establishment-clause.html 
[https://perma.cc/59SV-6369]; Eugene Volokh, Would Granting an Exemption from the 
Employer Mandate Violate the Establishment Clause? THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 4, 
2013, 5:11 PM) http://volokh.com/2013/12/04/3b-granting-exemption-employer-mandate-
violate-establishment-clause/ [https://perma.cc/5DJV-Z56G]; Kevin C. Walsh, A Baseline 
Problem for the “Burden on Employees” Argument Against RFRA-Based Exemptions from 
the Contraceptives Mandate, MIRROR OF JUST. (Jan. 17, 2014), 
https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2014/01/a-baseline-problem-for-the-burden 
-on-employees-argument-against-rfra-based-exemptions-from-the-contr.html 
[https://perma.cc/DF4R-USSP]. 
 17. Marc DeGirolami, Holt v. Hobbs and the Third-Party-Harm Establishment Clause 
Theory, MIRROR OF JUST. (Oct. 7, 2014), https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice 
/2014/10/where-has-the-establishment-clause-third-party-harm-argument-gone.html 
[https://perma.cc/FX8Q-7NH5]; see also Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions, Third-
Party Harms, and the Establishment Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1375, 1383–84 (2016). 
 18. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 253, 
263–66 (Max Lerner ed., 1961).  
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argue that the mere presence of harm is a sufficient condition requiring government 
intervention with religious rights.19 This significantly raises the stakes for 
determining what counts as cognizable “harm” under their theory. 
Reliance on a harm principle as a justification for government interference has 
strong intuitive appeal. At least superficially, it seems to be a theoretical shortcut for 
avoiding other difficult moral questions about which causes a government should or 
should not advance—a question on which there is little consensus in a pluralistic 
society. Pointing instead to harm seems like a neutral method for bypassing such 
moral conundrums. If this were true, there would be no question that this would 
present a desirable means of making a great many normative decisions in society. 
Indeed, relying on some sort of harm principle for decision-making has been 
attempted in numerous fields over numerous decades, from criminal law to 
environmental law.20 But unfortunately, significant moral question begging is 
involved in determining what exactly we mean by “harm.”  
Unless we use a purely subjective idea of harm that allows anything to count as 
harm that subjectively and negatively impacts someone’s interest, “harm” must 
become a term of art only including some sorts of interests and excluding others. At 
that point, any technical definition of harm must operate on top of a deep normative 
theory about which types of harm count and why. If the harm principle is broadened 
to include more expansive notions like dignitary harm or any impact on the 
 
 
 19. See infra Section II.A. 
 20. In the criminal context, progressives have argued that “victimless crimes” should not 
be prosecuted, such as drug use or prostitution. In response, conservatives have responded by 
pointing to harm related to such crimes and have also at times relied on a harm principle to 
justify banning things like pornography. Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm 
Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 139–55, 172–76 (1999); see also Steven G. 
Calabresi, On Liberty, Equality, and the Constitution: A Review of Richard A. Epstein’s The 
Classical Liberal Constitution, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 839, 956 (2014) (“Drug use, like 
suicide, is not a victimless crime. The victims of drug abuse include not only the abuser but 
also his family and his friends.”); Jerry Cederblom & Cassia Spohn, A Defense of 
Retributivism Against Criticisms of the Harm-for-Harm Principle, 43 CRIM. LAW BULL., 
Winter 2007, at 6 (“We maintain that most crimes that are called ‘victimless’ do indeed have 
victims, that in these cases the harm-for-harm principle can be applied, and that in the 
remaining cases decriminalization and treatment are probably appropriate. Although drug use 
often is portrayed as a victimless crime, potential victims include children (if drugs are used 
while caring for children), motorists (if drugs are used while driving), and neighbors (if drug 
use results in neighborhood deterioration). Similarly, the practice of prostitution has both 
direct and indirect victims. Prostitutes themselves are often victims of their pimps.”). 
Conversely, in the environmental context some libertarians have argued that only when a 
landowner causes environmental harm to a neighbor should that justify government 
interference with the landowner. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY 98–99 
(1998); see also Donald J. Kochan, A Framework for Understanding Property Regulation and 
Land Use Control from a Dynamic Perspective, 4 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 303, 322–23 
(2015) (“[J]udicial land use controls—particularly nuisance—are designed to enforce the 
prohibition against harming others. Put differently, they prevent one from imposing 
impermissible negative externalities on others.”). But progressives have argued for a broader 
conception of harm that would include things like greenhouse gas emissions and other 
downstream externalities to the environment. See EPSTEIN, supra, at 113–15 (discussing 
progressive arguments).  
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environment, arguably “every action generates some harm cognizable under the 
expanded harm principle.”21 
The normative appeal of the harm principle thus depends on its superficial 
simplicity. But once “harm” becomes a term of art, the normative justification for 
the theory becomes quite complex.22 And the plausibility of the harm principle trades 
on the assumption that there will be consensus about what constitutes harm. But there 
is no such consensus; only a plurality of views of what harm is.23 
Indeed, the lack of consensus on harm is highlighted by the fact that three different 
groups of third-party harm theorists define harm as a term of art to mean three very 
different things: a materiality standard meaning a burden that is relevant to decision-
making,24 an undue hardship standard for subsets of the population,25 and “targeted 
material or dignitary harms” on those who “do not share the [religious] claimant’s 
belief.”26 None of these scholars provide clear normative justifications why certain 
types of harms count under their definition and others do not. In addition, recently 
proposed legislation inspired by iterations of these third-party harm theories relies 
on an entirely different definition of harm. Specifically, the Do No Harm Act defines 
harm to include a specific laundry list of events, including things like any exemption 
from antidiscrimination laws, provisions of healthcare services, or government 
contracting requirements.27 Given this utter lack of consensus on what should count 
as harm, it is not surprising that scholars in other fields have observed the way the 
harm principle almost always collapses in upon itself.28 
The normative and doctrinal shortcomings with this undertheorized reliance on 
generic harm are highlighted by measuring the purported aims of this theory against 
its over- and underinclusive results. Specifically, it is overinclusive because if 
applied in an evenhanded way, the theory would actually remove religious 
exemptions for groups like religious minorities that third-party harm theorists 
generally acknowledge should receive protection.29 These groups include Muslim 
 
 
 21. EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 102.  
 22. See STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 70–106 (2010) 
(critiquing the harm principle on this basis in other contexts). 
 23. See EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 76 (“Should the application of the [harm] principle be 
limited to physical harm? What about competitive harms? Blocking of views? Personal 
offense? False or insulting words? No shortcut answers all the variations on the common 
theme.”).  
 24. Professor Gedicks and Ms. Van Tassell argue that harm means a “material” burden 
on others, meaning a burden that is “relevant to . . . decisions about how to act in some relevant 
way.” Gedicks & Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions, supra note 10, at 366. 
 25. Professors Tebbe, Schwartzman, and Schragger argue that the proper inquiry is 
whether an accommodation imposes an “undue hardship” on others, by which they mean a 
burden that is “more than . . . de minimis.” TEBBE, supra note 10, at 63; see also Tebbe et al., 
How Much May Accommodations Burden Others, supra note 10.  
 26. Professors NeJame and Siegel argue that cognizable harm only arises if “granting the 
religious exemption can inflict material and dignitary harms on those who do not share the 
claimant’s belief.” NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 10, at 190. 
 27. See Do No Harm Act, S. 2918, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 28. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 22, at 70–106; Harcourt, supra note 20, at 139–40. 
 29. NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 10, at 193 (“We commonly 
understand religious exemptions as protecting members of minority faith traditions not 
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prison inmates, Sikhs in the workplace, and Amish communities.30 And the theory is 
normatively underinclusive because it fails to provide any explanation whatsoever 
for why some competing third-party harms are simply ignored in the calculus.31 Nor 
can special prohibitions on religious harm, including things like dignitary harm, be 
normatively justified by the argument that such harms are unique. A comparison of 
the types of harms we permit in the speech context demonstrates that religious harm 
is quite similar in all meaningful respects.32  
Given the normative and descriptive shortcomings with the third-party harm 
theory, it is not surprising that courts are not, in fact, treating the presence of generic 
harm alone as a sufficient condition that bars government from offering religious 
protections. Instead, this Article argues that the sufficiency of the harm turns on other 
characteristics that accompany the harm, as well as the competing harm on the other 
side of the ledger. What is therefore needed is a careful analysis of which specific 
types of harm matter, when, and in what ways. This Article carefully describes the 
much more nuanced ways in which courts classify and weigh a variety of competing 
harms, and it identifies three categories of harm that arise not just with respect to 
religious exemptions, but across all First Amendment rights: (1) prohibited harms 
(meaning harms that are categorically impermissible); (2) probative harms (meaning 
relevant harms that can be balanced against other harms); and (3) inadmissible harms 
(meaning harms that are given no weight regardless of how severely or 
disproportionately they are experienced by third parties).33  
It is beyond the scope of this Article to assess whether the current doctrinal 
framework used by courts is normatively justified in every respect. However, this 
descriptive framework has important normative implications. A clear understanding 
of the role harm plays in courts’ treatment of various First Amendment rights 
highlights how it is ubiquitous in the law that protection of any such rights inherently 
involves competing harms on both sides of the ledger. Moving beyond a false 
dichotomy of harm versus no harm thus allows one to ask much more fruitful, 
normative questions about harm, including whether there is a justifiable trade-off 
between the specific harm and the social goods it provides, whether institutions can 
be modified to mitigate avoidable harm, and whether disproportionate harms can be 
distributed in more just ways. This Article also provides examples of how these 
necessary normative inquiries are already woven into the legal framework that 
governs many sorts of religious exemptions. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of the sources and 
categories of religious exemptions, as well as the development of current third-party 
 
 
considered by lawmakers passing laws of general application that burden religious exercise.”); 
Schwartzman et al., supra note 9, at 886–87, 899 (“[Third parties] have no reason to complain 
if the government uses their funds to lift burdens on a religious minority, provided the 
government is not advancing religion but protecting religious freedom, which is a secular 
good. . . . Religious accommodations like these promote inclusiveness and equality . . . .”). 
 30. For a thoughtful discussion about why protection of minority religious groups is so 
important, see Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 919, 946–48 (2004). 
 31. See infra Section II.A. 
 32. See infra Section II.B. 
 33. See infra Part III. 
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harm theories relying on versions of the harm principle. Part II provides a critique of 
the third-party harm theory, including a deconstruction of overreliance on an 
undefined and pluralistic concept of harm as a sufficient condition for government 
interference with religious rights. Part III provides a new descriptive framework for 
categorizing harm not just under the Establishment Clause but under parallel First 
Amendment rights of free speech and religious exercise as well. This Part also 
discusses how this framework sheds light on how the Court may revise some of its 
muddied Lemon jurisprudence in the near future. Part IV discusses the normative 
questions we should be asking with respect to harm. This Part also explores potential 
ways in which parties on both sides of the religious exemption debate may be able 
to find common ground through modifying institutions to mitigate avoidable 
conflicts that exacerbate harms and seek alternatives that are aimed at dispersing 
disproportionate harms. 
I. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS AND THIRD-PARTY HARM THEORIES 
A. A Brief Overview of Religious Exemptions 
A “religious exemption” is often described as something that occurs when the 
government removes a legal requirement that would apply to individuals if it were 
not for some relevant religious exercise or observance. Religious exemptions can be 
promulgated in statutes by legislatures, implemented in policies by administrative 
bodies, or carved out of laws essentially as “as-applied challenges” by the judiciary.34 
But the essential feature of religious exemptions is that they “lift[]” a government 
action “that burdens the exercise of religion.”35 This is why some critics have 
described religious exemptions as “a free pass to ignore laws that bind everyone 
else,”36 or as a “get-out-of-the-law-free-card.”37 
Religious exemptions take a range of forms, but Professor Kent Greenawalt has 
provided two helpful categories for considering exemptions.38 First, an exemption 
might take a “specific” form, in which it is a targeted exemption for a certain type of 
religious practice from specific laws.39 For example, a law allowing Native 
Americans to use peyote in religious practices is a specific exemption because this 
specific practice is allowed even though it would otherwise be prohibited for 
nonreligious purposes.40 Second, religious exemptions might take a broad and 
“general” form that creates a rebuttable presumption that the government generally 
 
 
 34. For a discussion of how religious exemptions are essentially just a form of as-applied 
challenges, see Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-
Applied Challenges? A Defense of Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1595 (2018). 
 35. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 338, 329 n.1 (1987). 
 36. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Is Religion an Excuse for Breaking the Law?, NEWSWEEK 
(Mar. 12, 2016, 10:51 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/are-religious-beliefs-excuse 
-breaking-law-435664 [https://perma.cc/8WKN-CV6E].  
 37. Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 34, at 1604–05 (collecting sources).  
 38. KENT GREENAWALT, EXEMPTIONS: NECESSARY, JUSTIFIED, OR MISGUIDED? 9 (2016). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2012) (protecting ceremonial use of peyote). 
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cannot burden an individual’s religious practice.41 To rebut this presumption, the 
government must demonstrate that it has a very strong justification for its action and 
that it cannot accomplish its goal some other way.42  
Specific religious exemptions in the United States are created legislatively or 
administratively. Specific exemptions date back to the American Revolution and 
even to some of the American colonies.43 Some classic examples include 
“exemptions from military service for pacifist denominations, exemptions for Jews 
from certain incest rules (specifically the ban on uncle-niece marriages), and 
religious exemptions from requirements that hats be removed in court.”44 In the 
nineteenth century, other exemptions were created, including a privilege to refuse to 
testify about the contents of confessions, exemptions in some states for Sabbatarians 
from Sunday closing laws, and exemptions for sacramental wine from state-level 
prohibition statutes (which were echoed in the 1919 federal prohibition statute).45 
On the other hand, rules requiring a general religious exemption regime have 
historically originated both in the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution as well as 
in statutes such as the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) or state 
versions of it.46 Constitutional regimes result in “mandatory” exemptions, whereas 
statutory regimes create “permissive” exemptions.47 One example of a mandatory 
constitutional exemption arose in the 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder.48 There, the 
Supreme Court exempted the Amish from public school attendance laws on religious 
exercise grounds.49 The Supreme Court arrived at this result after determining that 
the government did not have a very strong justification for refusing the exemption.50 
Some scholars have described Yoder as the “high water mark” of the Court’s 
constitutional religious exemption standard, but others question how consistently this 
 
 
 41. GREENAWALT, supra note 38, at 9.  
 42. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4. 
 43. Eugene Volokh, A Brief Political History of Religious Exemptions, WASH. POST: THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 21, 2015, 8:39 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/21/a-brief-political-history-of-religious-exemptions 
/?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/8ATW-FVDP].  
 44. Id.; see also Horwitz, supra note 6, at 167 (“Accommodation of religion is an 
aboriginal feature of American public law.”); Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of 
Religious Behavior and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1793, 1837 (2006) (“From the late seventeenth century to the present, there is 
an unbroken tradition of legislatively enacted regulatory exemptions. James Ryan, using a 
Lexis search and sampling techniques, estimated that there were 2000 religious exemptions 
on state and federal statute books in 1992.”). 
 45. Volokh, supra note 43. 
 46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4. An earlier version of this statute was invalidated in part 
by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). For a helpful overview of state RFRAs, see 
Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAS, 55 S.D. L. 
REV. 466 (2010). 
 47. See, e.g., Gedicks & Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions, supra note 10, at 356–57 
(discussing the difference between “mandatory” and “permissive” religious accommodations).  
 48. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 49. Id. at 234–36. 
 50. Id. at 236.  
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constitutional standard was applied by the courts.51 Nearly two decades later, in 
Employment Division v. Smith, the Court rejected the notion that the Free Exercise 
Clause requires mandatory religious exemptions from generally applicable and 
neutral laws.52 This significantly constrained the prospect of a general exemption 
regime under the Free Exercise Clause.  
However, the Court also noted that “a society that believes in the negative 
protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value 
in its legislation as well.”53 Thus, the Court noted that permissive religious 
exemptions could still be provided consistent with the First Amendment through the 
“political process.”54  
Legislatures at federal, state, and local levels responded to Smith by enacting 
precisely those sorts of permissive religious exemption statutes through their political 
processes. At the federal level, Congress passed the RFRA in an effort (in part) to 
restore the more protective general exemption framework.55 After RFRA was limited 
by the Supreme Court to only apply to the federal government, twenty-one different 
states also passed their own legislation similar to RFRA. Additional states have 
interpreted their constitutions to provide a more protective general exemption 
standard for protecting religious practices.56 And Congress later passed the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) to apply the RFRA exemption 
standard to state and local government actions in the context of land use zoning 
decisions and prison administration.57 
 
 
 51. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 222 (1995) (arguing that on the eve of Smith, 
religious exercise protections were much thinner than they were at the “high-water mark” 
period when Yoder was decided).  
 52. 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990). 
 53. Id. at 890.  
 54. Id. 
 55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4 (2012); see also Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, 
Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210, 243–44 (1994); 
Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 588 (1998) (noting that 
“RFRA is federal law, supported by a near unanimous House and Senate and an enthusiastic 
President”). 
 56. Eugene Volokh, Religious Exemptions – A Guide for the Confused, WASH. POST: THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 24, 2014, 6:32 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/03/24/religious-exemptions-a-guide-for-the-confused/ 
[https://perma.cc/L9TV-5ZVY].  
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc to -5. When Congress drafted this statute, two of RLUIPA’s 
Senate sponsors expressed concern that “prison officials sometimes impose frivolous or 
arbitrary rules. Whether from indifference, ignorance, bigotry, or lack of resources, some 
institutions restrict religious liberty in egregious and unnecessary ways.” 146 CONG. REC. 
16698, 16699 (2000) (joint statement of Senators Hatch and Kennedy); see also Derek L. 
Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA’S 
Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 510 (2005) (“After numerous hearings 
and two draft bills, the new law was eventually narrowed to address ‘those areas of law where 
the congressional record of religious discrimination and discretionary burden was the 
strongest:’ laws governing institutionalized persons (i.e., prisoners and persons in mental 
institutions) and land use laws.”).  
342 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:331 
 
Regardless of whether the source of the general religious exemption is 
constitutional or statutory, such general exemptions can only be made effective in 
practice by the judiciary.58 To judicially grant an exemption, a court must determine 
that the government has either failed to sufficiently justify its action or failed to prove 
that it cannot accomplish its goals some other way. At the federal level, as explained 
by President Bill Clinton during the RFRA signing ceremony, “What [RFRA] 
basically says is that the government should be held to a very high level of proof 
before it interferes with someone’s free exercise of religion. . . . We believe strongly 
that we can never . . . be too vigilant in this work.”59 
Aside from religious exemptions from government requirements, the government 
also sometimes creates laws that require private accommodation of religious 
practices.60 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an 
employer to discriminate against a current or prospective employee on the basis of 
religion.61 Title VII defines prohibited religious discrimination to include an 
employer’s failure to make “reasonabl[e] accommod[ations]” of an employee’s 
religious practices unless accommodation would pose “undue hardship.”62 But this 
requirement under Title VII does not result in a “religious exemption,” since the 
religious individual is not being exempted from a government legal requirement. On 
the other hand, Title VII does include a separate specific religious exemption for 
religious employers.63 In this exemption, Title VII removes employment 
 
 
 58. See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
434 (2006) (“RFRA, however, plainly contemplates that courts would recognize exceptions—
that is how the law works.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 59. Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 1993 PUB. 
PAPERS 2000, 2001 (Nov. 16, 1993). 
 60. “Religious accommodations” are often discussed in the context of “religious 
exemptions,” but for purposes of this Article, I refer to religious exemptions as a subcategory 
of the broader religious accommodations category. This Article refers to “religious 
accommodations” to mean the removal or amelioration of any sort of burden on a religious 
individual, including a private party’s alleviation of a burden caused by things like private 
employment policies. Such accommodating activity might be voluntary, or it might be 
mandated by other government policies. 
 61. Section 2000e-2(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) 
(2012), makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an 
employee or a prospective employee on the basis of his or her religion. At the time of the 
events involved here, a guideline of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1968), required, as the Act itself now does, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), that 
an employer, short of “undue hardship,” make “reasonable accommodations” to the religious 
needs of its employees. 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).  
 63. Section 2000e-1(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a), exempts 
religious organizations from Title VII's prohibition against discrimination in employment on 
the basis of religion. The relevant text reads as follows:  
This subchapter [i.e., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] shall not apply    
. . . to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with 
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work 
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational 
institution, or society of its activities. 
For a case interpreting this religious exemption, see Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of 
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requirements that the government would impose on the private employer but for the 
religious nature of the employer. This allows a religious employer to hire and staff 
consistent with the religious practices of the organization.64 This distinction between 
private religious accommodations and government religious exemptions is important 
for reasons that will be discussed below in Section III.B. 
B. New Theories Advocating Limits on Religious Exemptions that Result in Harm 
to Third-Parties  
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s hotly debated decisions in Hobby Lobby65 and 
Masterpiece Cakeshop,66 some scholars have argued that cost shifting resulting from 
religious exemptions is impermissible, both as a descriptive doctrinal matter under 
the Establishment Clause and as a normative matter.67 Since that time, other scholars 
including Professors Micah Schwartzman, Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger, and 
Andrew Koppelman have contributed their own thoughtful defense of this theory.68  
At its core, this Establishment Clause third-party harm theory asserts that 
“‘[r]eligious liberty’ does not and cannot include the right to impose the costs of 
observing one’s religion on someone else.”69 Put another way, the theory argues that 
“shifting the cost of accommodating the [religious individual]’s religious beliefs 
onto” parties who do not derive any benefit from that accommodation and “who may 
 
 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329 (1987). 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
 65. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); see also Horwitz, supra 
note 6, at 154. 
 66. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 67. See Gedicks & Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions, supra note 10, at 361. 
 68. See TEBBE, supra note 10, at 49–70; Koppelman & Gedicks, supra note 10, at 246–
47; Schwartzman et al., supra note 10, at 884; Tebbe et al., How Much May Accommodations 
Burden Others, supra note 10, at 215–29; Tebbe et al., When Do Accommodations Burden 
Others, supra note 10, at 328–46; Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, 
The Establishment Clause and the Contraception Mandate, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 27, 2013), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-establishment-clause-and.html 
[https://perma.cc/A57N-LDRS]; Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, 
Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part II: What Counts as a Burden on 
Employees?, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 4, 2013), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-
lobby-and-establishment-clause.html [https://perma.cc/S9XV-2QZM]; Micah Schwartzman, 
Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part III: 
Reconciling Amos and Cutter, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 9, 2013), https://balkin.blogspot.com 
/2013/12/hobby-lobby-and-establishment-clause_9.html [https://perma.cc/NY7Q-GZJX]; 
Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Reply to McConnell on Hobby 
Lobby and the Establishment Clause, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 30, 2014), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/reply-to-mcconnell-on-hobby-lobby-and.html 
[https://perma.cc/MUK3-8TF6]; Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, 
Holt v. Hobbes and Third Party Harms, BALKINIZATION (Jan. 22, 2015), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/01/holt-v-hobbs-and-third-party-harms.html 
[https://perma.cc/EQ3Q-DDUS]. 
 69. Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption 
for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51, 51 
(2014).  
344 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:331 
 
not share those beliefs” is constitutionally prohibited.70 However, different scholars 
have different definitions for what they say counts as “harm” under their theory. For 
ease of discussion, this Article will refer to operative harm as “cognizable harm.” 
Professor Gedicks and Ms. Van Tassell argue that cognizable harm means a 
“material” burden on others, meaning a burden that is “relevant to . . . decisions about 
how to act in some relevant way.”71 Alternatively, Professors Tebbe, Schwartzman, 
and Schragger argue that the proper inquiry is whether an accommodation imposes 
an “undue hardship” on a subset of the population, borrowing from Title VII’s 
religious accommodation standard. This standard looks at whether a burden is “more 
than . . . de minimis.”72 These theorists rely on the Burger Court case of Estate of 
Thornton v. Caldor as the leading precedent for this Establishment Clause 
principle.73  
Other scholars advocated against allowing religious exemptions that cause harm 
to others, though they have not based such prohibitions regarding harm on the 
Establishment Clause. Professors Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel, for example, 
have argued that “US law on religious liberty . . . restricts religious accommodation 
where accommodation would harm others.”74 They define cognizable harm a third 
way, to include harm from a religious exemption to include one that “inflict[s] 
targeted material or dignitary harms on other citizens” who do not “share the 
claimant’s belief.”75  
For ease of reference, this Article will at times refer to scholars who advance a 
theory placing limits on religious exemptions based on harm to others as “third-party 
 
 
 70. Frederick Mark Gedicks, One Cheer for Hobby Lobby: Improbable Alternatives, 
Truly Strict Scrutiny, and Third-Party Employee Burdens, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 153, 173 
(2015) (the theory is not concerned with “social costs” that are “fully distributed throughout 
society,” but instead concerns itself with “costs [that] are focused on a relatively small group 
of identifiable persons”); Nelson Tebbe, How to Think About Religious Freedom in an 
Egalitarian Age, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 353, 354–56 (2016). 
 71. Gedicks & Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions, supra note 10, at 366. 
 72. TEBBE, supra note 10, at 63; see also Tebbe et al., How Much May Accommodations 
Burden Others, supra note 10, at 217. Professors Tebbe, Schwartzman, and Schragger 
acknowledge that there is not a single, neutral baseline principle for measuring harm, but they 
do argue that “a promising model can be found in employment discrimination law” under 
“Title VII” because the “undue burden” standard would prevent a third party from being 
harmed “too much” and thus offer “an attractive and workable standard for limiting harms to 
third parties.” Id.; see also NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 62–
67 (2017) (discussing the “sensible” metric of the undue burden standard). But this still then 
relies on the undue burden standard as the measure of cognizable harm for purposes of 
Establishment Clause analysis, and a normative moral justification (rather than just a practical 
justification) is lacking for why that standard counts as the operative definition of cognizable 
harm as opposed to other standards, like “materiality.”  
 73. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
 74. NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 10, at 191.  
 75. Id. at 190, 200; see also NeJaime & Siegel, Religious Exemptions, supra note 10, at 
204–05 (“Going forward, the Court's concern about restraining religious exemptions so that 
they do not inflict material and dignitary harm on those who do not share the objector's beliefs 
should guide not only adjudication, but also the drafting of legislation concerning LGBT 
equality and reproductive healthcare.”). 
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harm theorists.” I count many of these scholars as friends and colleagues, and I 
appreciate the meaningful contributions they have made in drawing attention to 
important questions about harm. 
II. A FLAWED PERSPECTIVE OF HARM  
This Section examines some of the claims made by third-party harm theorists. 
Part A examines whether the presence of generic harm provides (or should provide) 
a sufficient condition for allowing government interference with religious liberty in 
the form of denying a religious exemption. And Part B examines whether religious 
externalities cause unique harms involving conscience, providing additional 
normative justification for government interference with religious rights. While 
third-party harm theorists’ claims are worthy of careful consideration, this Article 
argues that they prove to be theoretically unsound. 
A. The Unresolved Pluralism of “Harm” 
The theoretical approach of attempting to divide relevant acts into those that cause 
cognizable harm and those that do not has a long intellectual pedigree. One of the 
earliest articulations of the “harm principle” comes from John Stuart Mill, who 
famously argued that the “only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others.”76 “As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the 
interests of others,” Mill explained, “society has jurisdiction over it.”77  
Reliance on a harm principle as a justification for government interference with 
individual rights has strong intuitive appeal. At least superficially, it seems to be a 
theoretical shortcut for avoiding other difficult moral questions about which causes 
a government should or should not advance—a question on which there is little 
consensus in a pluralistic society. Pointing instead to harm seems like a neutral 
principle that allows us to bypass such moral conundrums. Indeed, that is why many 
scholars since John Stuart Mill have attempted to rely on some sort of harm principle 
in a variety of fields, from criminal law to the environmental context.78 But here we 
face what Professor Steven Smith describes as the “central dilemma” of any harm 
principle: we must determine what we mean by harm.79 
 
 
 76. MILL, supra note 18, at 263.  
 77. Id. at 322. Some countries also historically adopted this mode of thinking with regard 
to protecting individual liberty. For example, Article IV of the Declaration of the Rights of the 
Man and of the Citizen of 1789, set by France’s National Constituent Assembly after the 
French Revolution, states, “Liberty consists of doing anything which does not harm others: 
thus, the exercise of the natural rights of each man has only those borders which assure other 
members of the society the enjoyment of these same rights.” Liberty in the French Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), ONLINE LIBR. LIBERTY, 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/quotes/488 [https://perma.cc/WX2X-XH4D]; see also EPSTEIN, 
supra note 20, at 98–99 (describing the use of the harm principle in ancient Rome). 
 78. See supra notes 67–72.  
 79. SMITH, supra note 22, at 77. 
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Of course, harm could be referred to in the subjective sense, meaning any time 
someone sincerely believes that their interests have been adversely impacted by some 
occurrence, we agree that they have been.80 This version of harm preserves the 
principle’s attractive feature of a commonsensical and simplistic rule, which at least 
superficially lends to its normative force.81 However, proponents of any harm 
principle, from current third-party harm theorists back to John Stuart Mill, have been 
reluctant to concede that harm can subjectively mean anything.82 And for good 
reason. Once that concession is made, the principle provides government justification 
to regulate everything and anything, and thus becomes useless as a tool of 
demarcation for government intervention.  
Thus, what proponents of a harm principle quickly do is to use “harm” in a 
narrower, technical sense—essentially as a term of art that recognizes detrimental 
impacts on only some sorts of interests, but not others.83 But once proponents of a 
harm principle take this step, the theory often becomes enmeshed in significant moral 
question begging. When any technical definition of harm is adopted, that definition 
operates on top of a deep normative theory about which types of harm count and 
why. As Professor Joseph Raz has observed: 
Since “causing harm” entails by its very meaning that the action is prima 
facie wrong, it is a normative concept acquiring its specific meaning 
from the moral theory within which it is embedded. Without such a 
connection to a moral theory, the harm principle is a formal principle 
lacking specific concrete content and leading to no policy conclusions.84  
It is thus unsurprising that different groups throughout history and of varying 
political persuasions have relied on a harm principle to advance very different 
conceptions of harm and to justify very different sorts of government intervention. 
Returning to the criminal context, progressives began arguing in the 1960s and 1970s 
that government should not prosecute “victimless crimes” like marijuana use.85 
These arguments were countered by a campaign in the 1970s and 1980s against drug 
use that emphasized harms drugs caused to society.86 Subsequently, some 
 
 
 80. Id. at 78. 
 81. Id. at 81. 
 82. Id. at 87. 
 83. Id.  
 84. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 414 (1986); see also Eric Blumenson, 
Economic Rights as Group Rights, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 87, 90 (2011) (“The problem 
is that the ‘harm principle’ depends crucially on what counts as harm to others. Some claim, 
with Mill, that it violates the harm principle to prosecute ‘victimless crimes,’ among which 
they would include laws criminalizing intoxication, possession of pornography, and failing to 
use seatbelts. But that conclusion depends on a definition of ‘harm to others’ that excludes 
indirect and unintended effects.”) (citations omitted); Kent Greenawalt, Legal Enforcement of 
Morality, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 710, 724 (1995) (“Moral judgment is needed to 
determine what count as relevant harms . . . .”); Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition 
and the Weakness of Public Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2593, 2621 (1994) (book review) 
(discussing “the inherent subjectivity of ‘harm’”). 
 85. Harcourt, supra note 20, at 172. 
 86. Id. 
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conservative groups began using the harm principle to “justify laws against 
prostitution, pornography, public drinking, drugs, and loitering,” and in some 
instances, “regulation of homosexual and heterosexual conduct.”87 Criminal law 
scholar Professor Bernard Harcourt has argued that “the harm principle experienced 
an ideological shift from its progressive origins: today, the debate over drug use pits 
conservative harm arguments against new progressive arguments about ‘harm 
reduction.’”88 Harcourt thus argued that “[t]he proliferation of harm arguments in the 
debate over the legal enforcement of morality has effectively collapsed the harm 
principle.”89 
In the environmental context, conservative and other scholars have argued that 
regulation of private land use is not justified unless the landowner actually causes a 
physical intrusion, or “nuisance,” harming her neighbor’s property.90 But some 
progressives have argued that any action creating negative externalities on the 
environment, including things like increased CO2 emissions that are uniformly 
distributed in the atmosphere, constitutes cognizable harm justifying government 
intervention.91 Professor Epstein has argued that this broader conception of 
environmental harm, treating any “harm to the environment” as cognizable, “guts the 
ability of the harm principle to place limits on government action.”92 
Even looking back to some of the harm principle’s earliest discussion, Mill 
focused on tangible harms against individuals involving the use of force or fraud, 
and he did not treat losses resulting from competitive markets or discrimination as 
cognizable harm.93 Nor did Mill recognize lack of government entitlements as a form 
of cognizable harm, focusing instead on harm to negative rights. But some courts, 
employing the harm principle, have treated competitive losses in the marketplace as 
 
 
 87. Id. at 139; see also Calabresi, supra note 20, at 956 (“Drug use, like suicide, is not a 
victimless crime. The victims of drug abuse include not only the abuser but also his family 
and his friends.”); Cederblom & Spohn, supra note 20, at 6 (“We maintain that most crimes 
that are called ‘victimless’ do indeed have victims, that in these cases the harm-for-harm 
principle can be applied, and that in the remaining cases decriminalization and treatment are 
probably appropriate. Although drug use often is portrayed as a victimless crime, potential 
victims include children (if drugs are used while caring for children), motorists (if drugs are 
used while driving), and neighbors (if drug use results in neighborhood deterioration). 
Similarly, the practice of prostitution has both direct and indirect victims. Prostitutes 
themselves are often victims of their pimps.”). 
 88. Harcourt, supra note 20, at 172; see also Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Drugs, 
Dignity, and Danger: Human Dignity as a Constitutional Constraint to Limit 
Overcriminalization, 80 TENN. L. REV. 291, 301 (2013) (“The expansive reading of the harm 
principle, however, has resulted in turning an ostensibly liberal idea into a conservative 
concept, which is too readily able to generate harm arguments to justify expansive prohibitions 
that previously had only moralism rationales.”).  
 89. Harcourt, supra note 20, at 182. 
 90. EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 98; see also Kochan, supra note 20, at 322–23 (“[J]udicial 
land use controls—particularly nuisance—are designed to enforce the prohibition against 
harming others. Put differently, they prevent one from imposing impermissible negative 
externalities on others.”).  
 91. EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 98–99. 
 92. Id. at 99. 
 93. Id. at 77, 79, 93 (describing Mill’s theory).  
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cognizable, including losses to airlines, broadcasters, farmers, and other groups.94 
Many modern scholars view discrimination, and its attendant “dignitary harm,” as a 
particularly salient form of cognizable harm. For example, Professor David Strauss 
has equated the harmful social loss from “racial antipathy” to the tort of battery.95 
And modern scholars have advocated that loss of entitlements should absolutely be 
counted as a form of harm.96  
Perhaps it is the case that each generation is tempted to use the seductively simple 
theoretical shortcut of a harm principle as a means of bypassing thorny moral 
questions in various legal fields. But these drastically different conceptions of harm 
discussed above illustrate the way in which the harm principle often breaks down 
and reveals itself as merely providing a backdoor, obfuscated entrance to the same 
moral debate it was seeking to avoid.97 This is likely why scholars in other fields 
have argued that “[t]he idea of harm is too vague, too dependent on baseline 
assessments of private rights, too open to long chains of causal speculation, and too 
catastrophic in its categorical judgments to give liberty much practical protection.”98 
The normative appeal of the harm principle thus trades on its superficial 
simplicity. But once “harm” becomes a term of art, the normative justification for 
the theory becomes quite complex.99 And the plausibility of the harm principle trades 
on the assumption that there will be consensus about what constitutes harm. But in 
fact, there is no such consensus, only a plurality of views of what harm is.100 Harm 
cannot provide a neutral methodology for solving ultimate dilemmas of pluralism 
because the conception of harm itself is compromised by the very pluralism it 
attempts to resolve. This lack of consensus on harm is highlighted by the fact all three 
different groups of third-party harm theorists define harm as a term of art to mean 
very different concepts: a materiality standard meaning a burden that is relevant to 
decision-making,101 the Title VII undue burden standard for subsets of the 
 
 
 94. Id. at 91–93. 
 95. David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: 
The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1625 (1991). 
 96. RAZ, supra note 84, at 414 (“Roughly speaking, one harms another when one action 
makes the other person worse off than he was, or is entitled to be, in a way which affects his 
future well-being.”).  
 97. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health Against Individual Liberty: The 
Ethics of Smoking Regulations, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 419, 445 (2000) (“Because the harm 
principle provides the least controversial basis for regulation, and because some kind of harm 
can always be attributed to a particular behavior, many invoke the harm principle to ‘explain’ 
regulations that would be more appropriately justified on pure paternalistic grounds.”). 
 98. Donald A. Dripps, The Liberal Critique of the Harm Principle, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, 
SUMMER/FALL 1998, at 3, 3 (1998). 
 99. See SMITH, supra note 22, at 70–106 (critiquing the harm principle on this basis in 
other contexts). 
 100. EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 76 (“Should the application of the [harm] principle be 
limited to physical harm? What about competitive harms? Blocking of views? Personal 
offense? False or insulting words? No shortcut answers all the variations on the common 
theme.”).  
 101. Professor Gedicks and Ms. Van Tassell argue that harm means a “material” burden 
on others, meaning a burden that is “relevant to . . . decisions about how to act in some relevant 
way.” Gedicks & Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions, supra note 10, at 366. 
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population,102 and “targeted material or dignitary harms” on those who “do not share 
the [religious] claimant’s belief.”103 And none of these scholars provide clear 
normative justifications why their conception of harm is superior to any of the other 
concepts. Moreover, the recently proposed Do No Harm Act defines “harm” to 
include a specific laundry list of items, including things like any exemption from 
antidiscrimination laws, provisions of healthcare services, and government 
contracting requirements.104 Given this utter lack of consensus on what should count 
as harm, it is not surprising that scholars in other fields have observed the way the 
harm principle almost always collapses in upon itself.105 
Issues surrounding the plurality of harm can perhaps be mitigated, to some extent, 
if two things occur. First, a harm principle must be transparent about the underlying 
moral calculus justifying the proposed technical definition of harm that recognizes 
some interests but not others. Some proponents of a version of a harm principle, such 
as Professors Epstein and Raz, have worked to provide precisely this sort of 
transparent exposition of their underlying moral theory to advance their version of a 
workable harm principle.106 Second, the stakes of a definition of harm are lowered 
when a moral theory treats harm as necessary but not sufficient for government 
intervention. In other words, less rides on justifying the definition of harm when the 
lack of harm acts as a limitation on government intervention, but other factors than 
the simple presence of harm must arise to provide a justification for government 
intervention. Along these lines, both Professors Epstein and Raz argue that the 
presence of harm alone is not a sufficient condition for government intervention; 
rather, the sufficiency depends on the type of harm at issue and how that type 
 
 
 102. Professors Tebbe, Schwartzman, and Schragger argue that the proper inquiry is 
whether an accommodation imposes an “undue hardship” on others, by which they mean a 
burden that is “more than . . . de minimis.” TEBBE, supra note 10, at 63; see also Tebbe et al., 
How Much May Accommodations Burden Others, supra note 10.  
 103. NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 10, at 190, 200. Professors NeJaime 
and Siegel argue that cognizable harm only arises if “granting the religious exemption can 
inflict . . . targeted material or dignitary harms” on “those who do not share the claimant’s 
belief.” Id. 
 104. See Do No Harm Act, S. 2918, 115th Cong. (2018).  
 105. See, e.g., Harcourt, supra note 20, at 139–40; SMITH, supra note 22, at 70–106. 
 106. EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 76 (“[T]he key to applying the harm principle lies in our 
ability to lay bare the utilitarian judgments that underlie even the simplest cases of its 
application.”); RAZ, supra note 84, at 414 (“[The harm] principle is derivable from a morality 
which regards personal autonomy as an essential ingredient of the good life, and regards the 
principle of autonomy, which imposes duties on people to secure for all the conditions of 
autonomy, as one of the most important moral principles.”); see also Arthur Ripstein, Beyond 
the Harm Principle, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215 (2006) (arguing that our notions of harm really 
appeal to a larger “sovereignty principle”); id. at 245 (“[T]he sovereignty principle gives 
defenders of the harm principle the thing that they want most, protection of individual freedom 
from interference by the state. The harm principle is often held out as a bulwark against 
paternalism, but the sovereignty principle offers a better account of why it is objectionable.”). 
Of course, one could argue that it would be better to just rely directly on these utilitarian 
principles or autonomy principles rather than relying on a harm principle which does not, on 
its own, capture the nuance of these normative principles.  
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interacts with their underlying moral theory giving rise to their definition of harm.107 
This argument tracks with Mill’s conception of harm as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition.108 Similarly, Professor Harcourt has argued that the harm principle was 
“never intended to be a sufficient condition. It does not address the comparative 
importance of harms.”109 
In contrast, none of the third-party harm theorists offer a nuanced normative 
justification for why some interests count and others do not under their technical 
definition of harm. And worse yet, the stakes of the presence of harm are at their 
zenith under the third-party harm theory, as most of the theorists treat the mere 
presence of cognizable harm as a sufficient condition not just justifying but requiring 
government restriction of the religious individual’s rights. Put another way, third-
party harm theorists argue that exemptions (or the ability of the individual to exercise 
her religion free of government interference) are categorically prohibited if 
cognizable harm would result. 
The shortcomings with this theoretical approach are highlighted by measuring the 
purported aims of the third-party harm theory against its over- and underinclusive 
results. Specifically, its results are overinclusive because, as discussed below under 
Section II.A.1, the theory would actually remove religious exemptions for groups 
like religious minorities that third-party harm theorists generally acknowledge 
should receive protection. And as discussed in Section II.A.2, the theory is 
underinclusive because it fails to provide any normative explanation whatsoever for 
why some competing third-party harms to vulnerable groups are simply ignored in 
the calculus. 
1. The Third-Party Harm Theory’s Likely Impact on Religious Minorities 
At the heart of the third-party harm theory lies this foundational premise: that 
there is a meaningful category of religious exemptions which do not result in 
cognizable harm to third parties.110 Professors Schwartzman, Tebbe, and Schragger 
argued that “many accommodations are harmless, in the sense that they, quite 
literally, do not harm other people,” citing to examples of accommodations for Jews 
in the military or a Muslim prisoner.111 Similarly, Professors NeJaime and Siegel 
state that “[m]any religious liberty claims do not ask one group of citizens to bear 
the costs of another’s religious exercise.”112 These third-party harm theorists 
similarly argue that religious exemptions to religious minorities like Muslim prison 
 
 
 107. See EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 77, 79, 91–93, 98–99; RAZ, supra note 84, at 414.  
 108. EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 77, 79, 93; MILL, supra note 18, at 253, 263–66. 
 109. Harcourt, supra note 20, at 182 (emphasis omitted). 
 110. Schwartzman, supra note 10, at 798. Along similar lines, Kent Greenawalt has 
asserted that some religious exemptions “do not cause direct harm” to others. Greenawalt, 
supra note 84. As examples of this category of exemptions, Professor Greenawalt points to 
permitting Native Americans to use peyote in their religious services, giving tax exemptions, 
granting prisoners’ rights to wear longer beards than generally allowed, and excusing pacifists 
from military service. KENT GREENWALT, EXEMPTIONS: NECESSARY, JUSTIFIED, OR MISGUIDED 
9, 66, 137 (2016). 
 111. Id. 
 112. NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 10, at 200. 
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inmates, Sikhs in the workplace, and the Amish generally fall within this “harmless” 
category, and thus ought to be provided.113 Professors NeJaime and Siegel argue that 
the “most significant constitutional free exercise cases in the United States involve 
claims,” where “religious minorities sought exemptions” and the “costs of 
accommodating their claims were minimal and widely shared.”114  
But all of the examples that third-party harm theorists point to as permissible, 
essentially harmless religious exemptions do in fact involve allegations of significant 
cognizable harm to third parties. Thus, these minority groups likely would not have 
received any religious exemption if the third-party harm theory were taken to its 
logical conclusions and applied in an evenhanded way. 
For example, one case Professors NeJaime and Siegel cite to as involving a 
harmless religious exemption is Wisconsin v. Yoder.115 Yet one of the most 
prominent themes in the case was whether harm to identifiable Amish children in the 
form of a denial of public education should trump the religious exercise rights of the 
Amish parents.116 This argument that children would be harmed by a denial of 
education carried the day in the first two litigation proceedings before the trial and 
then the state appeals court.117 For example, the trial court expressed concern about 
potentially damaging implications for an “appreciable number of Amish-reared 
youth [who] may decide to subsequently adopt a different faith, join a different 
church, or leave the Amish community to become a part of a different culture.”118 
The trial court noted that children who desire later to venture outside the close-knit 
Amish community would be at a distinct disadvantage because they had not been 
allowed to obtain a traditional education and they may lack critical skills to help them 
succeed.119 The appellate court similarly noted that the trial had established many 
people who were born into the Amish families eventually left the church, and these 
people might be woefully unprepared for life outside the Amish community if they 
were “deprived of a reasonable degree of education” in their youth.120  
The Wisconsin Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court ultimately ruled the other 
way, but these rulings faced dissents that were also focused on harm to children. 
Specifically, Justice Heffernan on the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that the harm 
the government was trying to avoid was loss of education for “each and every child 
 
 
 113. Id. at 193 (“We commonly understand religious exemptions as protecting members 
of minority faith traditions not considered by lawmakers passing laws of general application 
that burden religious exercise.”); Schwartzman et al., supra note 9, at 886–⁠87, 899 (“[Third 
parties] have no reason to complain if the government uses their funds to lift burdens on a 
religious minority, provided the government is not advancing religion but protecting religious 
freedom, which is a secular good. . . . Religious accommodations like these promote 
inclusiveness and equality . . . .”). 
 114. NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 10, at 201.  
 115. Id. at 201 n.63 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)).  
 116. E.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 212. 
 117. State v. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d 539, 542 (Wis. 1971).  
 118. SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, THE YODER CASE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, EDUCATION, AND 
PARENTAL RIGHTS 99 (2003) (alteration in original). 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at 103 (quoting county circuit court opinion). 
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in the state” and that this “problem cannot be dismissed as de minimis.”121 He also 
noted that large numbers of Amish individuals leave the Amish community each year 
and are forced to make their way in the world without an education that equips them 
for modern life.122 Similarly, in his dissent from the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling, 
Justice Douglas stated that “[i]t is the future of the student . . . that is imperiled by 
today’s decision. If a parent keeps his child out of school beyond the grade school,” 
then those children might be “forever barred” from certain opportunities and even 
“stunted” in their development.123 In other words, the lack of comprehensive 
educational opportunities was more than de minimis, and it befell an identifiable 
subset of the population—Amish children in specified communities.124  
Under the third-party harm theory, these cognizable harms should have prohibited 
the religious exemption and ended the analysis. But that is not how the Supreme 
Court analyzed the case. Instead, the Court assessed this potential harm alongside a 
range of other factors, including the devastating harm that might befall the Amish 
community and the way in which Amish vocational education still allowed children 
to be productive members of the community.125 One might argue that these 
vocational opportunities for Amish children meant they did not really face harm. But 
that involves a recharacterization of the harm the government was seeking to avoid: 
equipping Amish children with the skills they would need to succeed in a world 
outside the Amish community in case they chose that course. Along these same lines, 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel would describe the harm in this case as falling outside 
their technical definition of harm because the Court’s decision assumes that the 
children share the religious beliefs of their Amish parents. But the concern about 
harm for the lower courts and dissenting Justices was precisely the possibility that 
some children did not, or at least one day may not, share those beliefs and would be 
at that time ill-equipped to transition out of a community with beliefs they no longer 
shared. Thus, the result in this case was one in which the Supreme Court provided a 
religious exemption even over objections about cognizable harm to third parties. 
Another exemption Professors NeJaime and Siegel point to as “not detrimentally 
affect[ing] others” is the one at issue in Holt v. Hobbs, a 2015 case where the 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of a prisoner who sought a religious exemption from 
the prison’s no-beard policy.126 However, in that case the state government alleged 
that providing an exemption for a beard could result in “deadly” consequences for 
both prison guards and other prisoners.127 This included providing inmates with an 
 
 
 121. Yoder, 182 N.W at 549 (Heffernan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 122. Id.  
 123. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245–46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
 124. Some third-party harm theorists argue that Yoder is distinguishable because the 
majority decision downplayed any real harm to children. But the broader point is that there is 
no way to deny the harm in Yoder when measuring harm by the same metric third-party harm 
theorists advocate under their various theories. So Yoder was either wrongly decided, or third-
party harm theories are inconsistent with this precedent. But both cannot be correct. 
 125. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222–24. As Justice White also noted, the government had simply 
failed to fully develop this concern on the trial court record. Id. at 240 (White, J., concurring). 
 126. NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 10, at 200, 200 n.62 (citing Holt v. 
Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).  
 127. Brief for Respondent at 46, Holt, 135 S. Ct. 853 (No. 13-6827), 2014 WL 3704560. 
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“important hiding place for contraband,” including “needles, homemade darts, pieces 
of broken razors, drugs, . . . SIM cards[,] . . . pieces of fence wire, staples, and 
paperclips” that could be used to harm “inmates and staff alike.”128 
In its unanimous ruling, the Supreme Court did not ultimately hold that the 
religious exemption in Holt posed no threat of harm to third parties—it certainly said 
nothing about de minimis harm. While it raised skepticism about some of the 
government’s claims, the Court ultimately determined under strict scrutiny review 
that the government could not deny a religious exemption based on the same type of 
harm it allowed for other secular reasons. Specifically, in Holt the government was 
willing to assume potential harm related to quarter-inch beards for medical reasons, 
but not half-inch beards for religious reasons. The Court explained, “[t]he 
Department suggests that requiring guards to search a prisoner’s beard would pose a 
risk to the physical safety of a guard if a razor or needle was concealed in the beard. 
But that is no less true for searches of hair, clothing, and ¼–inch beards.”129 Thus, 
because the prison was not seeking to prevent harm in an even-handed way, the Court 
prohibited the prison from attempting to prevent harm exclusively for religious 
reasons.  
There is little reason to believe that Holt would have turned out the same way if 
the Court were merely assessing whether or not alleged harm to third parties was 
more than de minimis, and there is significant reason to believe that the case would 
have gone the other way under the third-party harm theory. One case illustrating this 
contrast is Tagore v. United States in the Fifth Circuit.130 There, a Sikh employee 
brought an action against the IRS for refusing to allow her to wear her kirpan, a dull 
blade that is one of five articles of faith that Sikh adherents are required to wear. 
Because the case involved the federal government acting as an employer, both 
RFRA’s strict scrutiny and Title VII’s de minimis standards applied. Under the 
undue burden, or de minimis standard, the court simply accepted the IRS’s word that 
requiring security officials to ensure that the employee’s blade was dull enough was 
more than a “de minimis” harm to the employer.131 But under RFRA’s rigorous strict 
scrutiny review, the analysis was much different. The same court noted that the 
government had been inconsistent in its enforcement of its policy. For instance, it let 
other weapons in the building for lawful purposes, and it had let Sikh individuals 
wear their kirpans in buildings like the White House.132 Thus, the court determined 
that RFRA’s “fact-sensitive inquiry” required reversal of the lower court and remand 
for further inquiry into less restrictive alternatives to accommodate this employee’s 
religious beliefs.133  
Some third-party harm theorists try to avoid acknowledging the harm at issue in 
cases like Holt and Tagore by further limiting the technical sense in which they use 
the word harm, arguing that it should include only direct, concrete harm and not 
increased risk of harm or unsubstantiated allegations of harm.134 But this argument 
 
 
 128. Id. at 45–46. 
 129. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864 (majority opinion). 
 130. 735 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 131. Id. at 330. 
 132. Id. at 331. 
 133. Id. at 331–32. 
 134. See, e.g., Gedicks & Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions, supra note 10, at 363–64 
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has both doctrinal and normative problems. As a normative matter, third-party harm 
theorists fail to justify why increased risks of physical harm or indirect harms to 
certain groups, as in Holt, do not count as cognizable harm in their calculus.135 
Indeed, the normative question of how tight a causal connection should be has caused 
disagreement among scholars relying on harm principles in other fields. Professor 
Raz argues that “an action harms a particular person only if it affects him directly 
and significantly by itself. It does not count as harming him if its undesirable 
consequences are indirect and depend on the intervention of other actions.”136 On the 
other hand, Professor Blumenson has noted that excluding “indirect and unintended 
effects” of harm renders this principle “inadequate” for addressing “damaging 
downstream consequences for others.”137 A cost that some refer to as “invisible 
externalities” provides a good example of potentially deadly unintended or indirect 
harm. As Professors Lisa Grow Sun and Brigham Daniels have observed, “[c]ertain 
kinds of externalities are both difficult to see and difficult to measure, usually 
because they involve increased risk rather than an immediately discernible, concrete 
effect.”138 Similarly, Professors Holmes and Sunstein have drawn attention to child 
welfare tragedies such as Joshua DeShaney, a child who was beaten into a state of 
severe mental disability when knowing government workers failed to intervene.139 
Professors Holmes and Sunstein argue that perhaps if we had provided more 
resources to enforcing Joshua’s legal interests, rather than distributing those 
resources to other interests, the outcome for Joshua would have been different.140 
 
 
(“[E]xemption from the draft for religious pacifists increases the mathematical likelihood that 
nonpacifists and secular pacifists will be drafted in their place . . . The risk of being drafted 
already exists and is already substantial; . . . The additional burden imposed by accommodating 
religious pacifists . . . is barely measurable; those accommodated are so few compared to the 
entire population subjected to the law that it is not reasonable to understand the exemption as 
a meaningful third-party burden.”) (footnotes omitted); Schwartzman et al., supra note 10, at 
904 (“Because the risk of harm is small and diffuse, it does not trigger the third-party harm 
doctrine.”); see also Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 69, at 57 (“Like the incremental tax 
increase in Walz, the religious pacifist exemption barely increased an already-existing burden 
that was substantial in its own right and thus did not impose significant additional costs on 
others in violation of the Establishment Clause. Although whoever was drafted in place of the 
objectors faced the consequence of going to war, the pre-existing probability of those persons’ 
being drafted was not significantly increased by the exemption.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 135. Nor is it clear why, doctrinally, increased risk of harm would be irrelevant to a 
“materiality” standard. And it is simply not clear at all what “targeted” and “material” harm 
mean, as that is not a standard that has been applied elsewhere in the law. Gedicks and Van 
Tassell, supra note 10, at 366; NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 10, at 190, 
200. 
 136. RAZ, supra note 84, at 416. 
 137. Blumenson, supra note 84, at 90–91. 
 138. Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
135, 160 (2014); see also Charles R. Beitz, Justice and International Relations, 4 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 360, 383–85 (1975) (describing circumstances in which invisible externalities come 
home to roost).  
 139. STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS 
ON TAXES 87–89 (2013). 
 140. Id. at 19, 87–89.  
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Normative questions that must be addressed in this context include things like how 
much increased risk is too much? Do the third party’s subjective concerns about the 
risk matter? Shouldn’t the gravity of the harm matter? Increased gravity of harm in 
the tort context operates to decrease the probability of risk required.141 So where the 
harm at issue is very grave, such as potential death or “fatal” injury of prison security 
guards who have to perform additional searches in Holt, should we really require a 
very high probability of that harm occurring to normatively recognize the harm as 
cognizable? If so, why? These are all normative questions left unanswered under 
current third-party harm theories.  
And perhaps more importantly as a doctrinal matter, the Tagore case above and 
other Title VII cases illustrate that courts recognize increased risk of harm and even 
unsubstantiated claims of harm as cognizable under Title VII’s undue burden 
standard. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has specifically stated, “The mere possibility of an 
adverse impact . . . is sufficient to constitute an undue hardship.”142 The Title VII 
undue burden standard often recognizes unsubstantiated employer allegations of 
harm as sufficient to constitute more than a de minimis burden. In a First Circuit 
case, for example, an employer made very hypothetical claims about how a religious 
accommodation from a dress code would cause an undue burden without providing 
any corroborating evidence or even cost-benefit analysis.143 But the court said that 
was enough to constitute an undue burden.144 The Tagore case similarly illustrates 
how the current strict scrutiny standard under RFRA operates to flesh out baseless 
and exaggerated claims of harm, but the undue burden standard under Title VII does 
not.145 Thus, third-party harm theorists who advocate this Title VII standard cannot 
distinguish away these risk-related, indirect, or unsubstantiated claims of harm; those 
claims would likely be dispositive in removing religious exemptions for religious 
minorities who need them most if the undue burden standard actually supplanted 
strict scrutiny.146 
To provide a final illustration of a religious exemption that third-party harm 
theorists inaccurately describe as harmless, Professors Tebbe, Schwartzman, and 
Schragger point to a kosher diet being offered to Jewish inmates.147 They assert that 
such an exemption is “normatively unproblematic” if the government taxes the 
public to provide kosher meals, but it would not be “normatively permissible” for the 
government to “tax . . . nonreligious inmates” to provide kosher meals to Jewish 
 
 
 141. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Strict Liability in Action: The Truncated Learned Hand 
Formula, 52 LA. L. REV. 323, 324–25 (1991) (discussing the Learned Hand formula). 
 142. Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). 
 143. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 135 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 144.  Id. at 137. 
 145. Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 330–31 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 146. The claim that Title VII’s standard would provide sufficient protection for religious 
minorities is a bit puzzling because the third-party harm theory would give courts fewer 
tools—not more—to weed out meritless claims about externalities from religious minorities’ 
religious practices. After all, Title VII only requires the government to point to a harm more 
than de minimis, a quite different standard than the demanding showing of a compelling 
government interest currently required under strict scrutiny. 
 147. Schwartzman et al., supra note 10, at 886. 
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inmates.148 This argument has some intuitive appeal, but upon closer inspection this 
line-drawing breaks down, leaving no real meaningful difference between the 
categories. As it turns out, the government not infrequently (and not unreasonably) 
argues that providing a kosher or halal diet to prisoners would result in significant 
costs to other prisoners and prison officials, operating as an effective tax on these 
individuals. 
For example, in one Eleventh Circuit case where an inmate in Florida requested a 
kosher dietary exception, the Florida Department of Corrections responded that costs 
related to providing such an accommodation would result in less funding for “roofs 
for prisons, mental health and medical care for inmates, and salaries for security 
staff,” and that less resources could even compromise the “security and safety of the 
institutions.”149 The Department also argued that the increased costs of the diet would 
result in a “hiring freeze,” as well as a situation where the Department “would have 
to eliminate 246 staff positions in its already minimally staffed facilities.”150 All of 
these harms, if true, would likely constitute more than de minimis negative 
externalities for identifiable third parties.151 Prison officials similarly successfully 
argued in the Fifth Circuit that the prison could not provide a kosher diet because the 
prison’s “ability to provide a nutritionally appropriate meal to other offenders would 
be jeopardized (since the payments for kosher meals would come out of the general 
food budget for all inmates).”152 While the government was likely exaggerating the 
consequences from increased costs to some extent in both of these cases, the officials 
were correct in noting that more funding spent on kosher meals operates as an 
effective tax on other inmates by resulting in less resources for the needs of these 
inmates.  
This issue of effective taxes on other inmates arises even for religious exemption 
requests that don’t involve items a prison must pay for directly.153 As discussed 
above, in a case where Muslim inmates requested to wear a kufi, a religious head 
covering, the prison estimated that this would cost $702,500 annually across the 
prison system in redistributed staff time and resources.154 In addition, one prison has 
estimated that the cost in just one state of allowing prisoners to wear beards slightly 
longer than the ones at issue in Holt would cost over $1.1 million annually when 
accounting for additional staff time to search beards.155 While some courts have 
 
 
 148. Id.  
 149. Appellants’ Initial Brief at 36, 38, United States v. Sec’y, Fla. Dept. of Corr., 828 F.3d 
1341 (11th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-14117). 
 150. Id. at 36–37. 
 151. The court in this case ultimately agreed that there would be “increased costs” drawing 
from limited resources for inmates to accommodate the kosher diet, though the court disagreed 
that “operations of the prison” would come screeching to a halt as a result of increased cost. 
Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d at 1347 (quoting Garner v. Kennedy, 713 F.3d 237, 246 (5th Cir. 
2013)). 
 152. Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 125 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 153. See, e.g., Ali v. Stephens, 822 F.3d 776, 796 (5th Cir. 2016) (discussing the cost of 
additional search time by staff). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 792. 
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found these sorts of costs to be acceptable compared to larger prison expenditures,156 
the costs nonetheless arguably operate to redistribute resources away from other 
inmates for things like better buildings, healthcare, activities, and food. At the very 
least, an “effective tax” argument would be something government officials could 
plausibly argue to defeat virtually any religious exemption in prison if that were 
actually the standard. Religious minorities would likely be especially impacted by 
such a rule, as one empirical study found that “[o]ver half” of all cases dealing with 
religious exemption requests from prisoners “involved non-Christian religious 
minorities” and the “most frequently appearing were Muslims, Jews, and Native 
Americans.”157  
One could argue that the prison context is unique, because prison budgets are 
constrained and prisoners are dependent on government officials to exercise their 
rights. No doubt religious exemptions in the prison context raise special challenges. 
But in another sense, the prison context offers a helpful microcosm to study the ways 
in which protecting any rights impact third parties when such protections must 
expend scarce resources that could be used elsewhere.  
At the most basic level, redistribution results from the sober reality that resources 
devoted to enforcing some rights will draw resources away from other important 
rights or legal interests, and those third parties who do not receive those resources 
thus experience harm.158 As Professors Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein note in 
their recent book, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes, “conflicts 
among rights stem from a common dependency of all rights on limited budgetary 
outlays. Financial limits alone exclude the possibility of all basic rights being 
enforced maximally at the same time.”159 Professors Holmes and Sunstein challenge 
 
 
 156. Id. at 797 (“The record below indicates that TDCJ's budget for staff salary and wages 
was $1.045 billion in 2014, which is roughly one-third of its total operating budget of $3.1 
billion. TDCJ has not shown it has a compelling interest in saving less than .004% of its budget 
that is dedicated to CO compensation. [Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t. of Criminal Justice, 703 
F.3d 781, 795 (5th Cir. 2012)] (expressing doubt that TDCJ had a compelling interest in saving 
$88,000 in food-related expenses where that cost amounted to ‘less than .05% of the food 
budget.’)”). 
 157. Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N. Busick, Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers: An 
Empirical Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cases, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 353, 375–77 
(2018). Proponents assert that the third-party harms theory preserves the ability of courts to 
weed out “weak” government official objections based on costs to third parties.  
 158. HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 139, at 125, 223–24 (“Legal rights have ‘opportunity 
costs’; when rights are enforced, other valuable goods, including rights themselves, have to be 
forgone (because the resources consumed in enforcing rights are scarce). The question is 
always, might not public resources be deployed more sensibly in some other way?”). On a 
more abstract level, as Professor Wesley Hohfeld recognized long ago, any positive legal 
interest legally recognized for one individual results in a negative interest for another. Rights 
correlate with duties, privileges correlate with a “no-right,” powers correlate with liabilities, 
and immunities correlate with disabilities. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917). 
 159. HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 139, at 101. Similarly, Professor Wesley Hohfeld 
long ago observed that any time society chooses to give legal protection to the interest of one 
individual, it must do so by placing some sort of legal burden on other individual. According 
to Hohfeld, if the law provides one individual with a right, privilege, power, or immunity, then 
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the “widespread but obviously mistaken premise that our most fundamental rights 
are essentially costless.”160 Legal rights (as opposed to moral rights)161 “remain a 
hollow promise” absent political authority that is willing and able to intervene to 
enforce remedies for those rights; a “legal right exists, in reality, only when and if it 
has budgetary costs.”162 Since “legal rights are subsidized by taxes levied on the 
community at large, not by fees paid by the individuals who happen to be exercising 
them at the moment[,] . . . redistribution in the field of rights protection seems to be 
inevitable.”163 A societal protection of any right, including constitutional rights, 
“presuppose[s] political decisions (which could have been different) about how to 
channel scarce resources most effectively given the shifting problems and 
opportunities at hand.”164  
For some third parties, those redistributive costs can be experienced in acute, 
disproportionately harmful, and even deadly ways. Indeed, costs borne by society in 
exchange for certain social goods are likely never distributed perfectly evenly across 
the populous. If a religious exemption could be defeated any time government could 
argue that the exemption operated to effectively tax some segment of the population 
in a disproportionate way, few if any religious exemptions could survive. And as 
illustrated above, all of the exemptions for religious minorities that third-party harm 
theorists view as normatively desirable involved cognizable harm and thus likely 
could not have survived an evenhanded application of the theory. 
2. Overlooked Competing Harms for Other Vulnerable Third Parties  
The third-party harm theory relies on the normative premise that religious 
exemptions are not morally justified when they impose externalities on third parties. 
Professor Gedicks and Ms. Van Tassell describe religious harms as “externalities” 
because they can result in “a cost that one person, firm, or group imposes on others 
without their consent.”165 
However, the perception of externalities flowing in just one direction has long 
been challenged by economists.166 For example, R.H. Coase stated, “The question is 
 
 
the law must place on other individuals the “jural correlative” of a duty, no-right, liability, or 
disability. These legal interests may be exercised against others on what Hohfeld calls the 
“paucital” level—meaning against identifiable individuals, or by a compound aggregate of 
these individuals with what he calls “multital” rights. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 716–17 
(1917); Thomas A. Alspaugh, Hohfeld’s Jural Relations, PROJECT SCIENTIST (May 11, 2019, 
10:36 AM), https://thomasalspaugh.org/pub/fnd/hohfeld.html [https://perma.cc/A3LM-
S4GN]. 
 160. HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 139, at 25.  
 161. Legal rights refer to legally enforceable rights. Moral rights encompass a different, 
though often overlapping category, of rights thought to be aspirational and natural. 
 162. HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 139, at 19.  
 163. Id. at 111.  
 164. Id. at 222. 
 165. Gedicks & Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions, supra note 10, at 358 (quoting Michael 
W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46 (1989)); see also Schwartzman et al., supra note 10, at 912. 
 166. For a discussion of this, see Sun & Daniels, supra note 138, at 137 (citing R.H. Coase, 
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commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has to be 
decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are dealing with a 
problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A.”167 
According to what scholars now refer to as the Coase theorem, “[t]he real question 
that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to 
harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm.”168 To provide an 
illustration, a quintessential example of externalities involves damage that engine 
sparks from a passing train causes to a farmer’s crops.169 The intuitive approach 
would be to view the train company as the party imposing harm on the farmer. But 
Coase argues that we might just as easily view the externality as being imposed on 
the train company by the farmer preventing the train from making sparks to raise 
crops that will not benefit the train company.170 As Professors Lisa Sun and Brigham 
Daniels have explained, situations where one individual’s harm is another 
individual’s gain, and vice versa, are known as “reciprocal bilateral externalities.”171 
The presence of such reciprocal bilateral externalities is particularly relevant in 
the religious exemption context. Take, for example, an incident where government 
officials unanimously denied a permit for a Sikh gurudwara, or temple, after “citing 
neighbors’ complaints regarding increased noise and traffic.”172 Noises caused by a 
Sikh temple are an externality imposed on the neighbors who would prefer a quiet 
neighborhood. But the insistence on a quiet neighborhood results in an externality 
imposed on the Sikh group, as it prevents them from peacefully exercising their 
religion on their own property. 
Some may argue that negative externalities imposed on the religious adherent 
seeking an exemption are less deserving of consideration because such an individual 
is attempting to impose the cost of their religious practice (from which they benefit) 
 
 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2–5 (1960)).  
 167. Coase, supra note 166, at 2. 
 168. Id.; see also JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 218 (1984) (“The world is full of 
situations which are such that the interests of one party can be advanced only at the expense 
of the interests of others, and vice versa, or—even more unhappily—such that the interests of 
one party can avoid being defeated or thwarted only if that party acts in a way that will set 
back the interests of another party and vice versa.”). 
 169. Gedicks &Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions, supra note 10, at 358 n.58 (citing RICHARD 
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.10, at 71 (6th ed. 2003)). 
 170. See Francesco Parisi, Coase Theorem, in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 
(Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2008); RICCARDO 
REBONATO, TAKING LIBERTIES: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 111 
n.44 (2012) (discussing reciprocal externalities); HOLLEY H. ULBRICH, PUBLIC FINANCE IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 111 (Routledge 2011) (2003); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Coase 
Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 633 (2009); Alan Randall, Coasian 
Externality Theory in a Policy Context, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 35, 36–46 (1974); Oliver E. 
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. 
& ECON. 233, 233 (1979); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 002: The Coase 
Theorem, LEGAL THEORY LEXICON, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon 
/2003/09/legal_theory_le_1.html [https://perma.cc/RE4T-DTZJ].  
 171. Sun & Daniels, supra note 138, at 137 (citing Coase, supra note 166, at 2–5).  
 172. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 
2006).  
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onto individuals in society who do not benefit from such a practice. Thus, harm 
should be relevant only if it is befalling non-benefitting third parties. Such an 
argument is dubious because it again ignores bilateral reciprocal externalities and 
fails to provide a normative justification for such an omission. But even if we take 
as true the assumption that cognizable harm only involves externalities flowing to 
parties not directly involved in the religious practice, what about reciprocal bilateral 
externalities involving other third parties? Specifically, what about third parties who 
rely heavily on or benefit significantly from religious individuals or organizations 
that operate as a result of religious exemptions and who would experience significant 
harm as a consequence of the denial of a religious exemption? 
For example, hundreds of thousands of third parties are currently served by 
religious homeless shelters that only operate because of a specific religious 
exemption under the Fair Housing Act.173 Countless foster children and families are 
served by religious adoption agencies which can only operate because of specific 
religious exemptions under state law.174 One foster mother in the Supreme Court’s 
 
 
 173. See, e.g., Intermountain Fair Hous. Council v. Boise Rescue Mission Ministries, 657 
F.3d 988, 995 (9th Cir. 2011).Although § 3604(a) and (b) of the [Fair Housing Act] 
prohibit religious discrimination generally, in 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a) Congress 
provided an exemption for religious organizations that want to limit access to their 
charitable services to people who practice the same religion. Specifically, § 3607(a) 
provides in relevant part:  
(a) Nothing in [the FHA] shall prohibit a religious organization . . . from limiting 
the sale, rental or occupancy of dwellings which it owns or operates for other 
than a commercial purpose to persons of the same religion, or from giving 
preference to such persons, unless membership in such religion is restricted on 
account of race, color, or national origin. 
The Ninth Circuit upheld this religious exemption for a homeless shelter even where doing so 
resulted on more than de minimis negative externalities on third parties. Id.; see also Rebecca 
Boone, Court Rules in Favor of Boise Rescue Mission, LEWISTON TRIB. (Sept. 20, 2011), 
https://lmtribune.com/northwest/court-rules-in-favor-of-boise-rescue-mission/article 
_7c8b2c32-9722-5e40-9e12-e1cc72a42595.html [https://perma.cc/L3TH-P49Z]. For some 
examples of positive externalities that resulted from this religious charity, see Case Summary: 
Intermountain Fair Housing Council v. Boise Rescue Mission Ministries, BECKET LAW, 
https://www.becketlaw.org/case/intermountain-fair-housing-council-v-boise-rescue-mission-
ministries/ [https://perma.cc/94Y4-FULN] (“From 2012 to 2013 alone, [Boise Rescue 
Mission] welcomed nearly 5,000 new guests, served about 700,000 meals, and provided 
250,000 beds. Hundreds have graduated from its recovery program . . . .”).  
 174. See, e.g., Melissa Buck, Catholic Adoption Agencies: A Private-Public Adoption 
System that Works, HILL (Mar. 6, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-
rights/376984-catholic-adoption-agencies-a-private-public-adoption-system-that-works 
[https://perma.cc/4B4V-3VJG]; Shamber Flore, Column: My Adoption Agency Saved Me, 
DET. NEWS (Mar. 7, 2018, 10:48 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/2018/03 
/07/religious-adoption-agencies-aclu/32717127/?platform=hootsuite [https://perma.cc/FZ8N-
CGG2]; Sharonell Fulton, Opinion, My Faith Led Me to Foster More than 40 Kids; Philly Is 
Wrong to Cut Ties with Catholic Foster Agencies, PHILA. INQUIRER (May 24, 2018, 2:25 PM), 
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/opinion/commentary/catholic-social-services-philadelphia-
lawsuit-lgbtq-gay-foster-parents-adoption-sharonell-fulton-20180524.html 
[https://perma.cc/L8A5-VRAW]; Kathryn Jean Lopez, Foster Children in Philadelphia 
Deserve Better than Unnecessary Limbo as Religious-Liberty Dispute Lingers, NAT’L REV. 
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pending Fulton case spoke about the deep pain and dignitary harm she felt watching 
the government publicly deride religious beliefs she shared by condemning the 
religious beliefs of a foster agency she had worked with for years.175 And if one 
considers positive externalities from accommodated religious groups, studies suggest 
that by accommodating religious practices of inmates, prisons are able to reduce 
infraction rates and inmate violence and increase rehabilitation, which benefits both 
religious inmates and nonreligious inmates alike.176 Under the third-party harm 
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 175. Fulton, supra note 174 (“As a single mom and woman of color, I've known a thing or 
two about discrimination over the years. But I have never known vindictive religious 
discrimination like this, and I feel the fresh sting of bias watching my faith publicly derided 
by Philadelphia's politicians. . . . To see the city condemn the foster agency that has made 
possible my life's work fills me with pain. To know that the City of Philadelphia may soon 
take from me the work that brings me the greatest joy frightens me. And to think that the city 
would rather score political points than to offer true hope and a future to our city's most 
vulnerable children makes me angry.”). 
 176. See Clear & Sumter, supra note 5, at 147–52; Johnson et al., Religious Programs, 
supra note 5, at 148–49; O’Connor & Perreyclear, supra note 5; see also Clear & Myhre, 
supra note 5; Johnson, supra note 5; Johnson et al., Systematic Review, supra note 5. 
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theory as currently articulated, these sorts of externalities are not given any weight 
at all in the normative analysis. Indeed, the third-party harm theory is simply not 
equipped to compare or weigh competing claims of harm. This is why some scholars 
have noted that a harm principle was “never intended to be a sufficient condition” 
for government coercion.177 
B. Are Religious Externalities Uniquely Harmful?  
Even if reliance on generic harm in other legal contexts proves normatively 
unsatisfying, third-party harm theorists have argued that harms flowing from 
religious protections are uniquely problematic. Three variations of this argument 
have been offered: (1) religious externalities involve competing claims of conscience 
“on both sides” of a debate,178 (2) religious exemptions can result in unique 
“dignitary harm” by describing some third-party conduct as sinful,179 and (3) 
religious exemptions can significantly “obstruct the achievement of major social 
goals” by making claims “fraught with . . . powerful social meaning” that is harmful 
to groups that “the law has only recently come to protect.”180 This Section addresses 
each argument in turn and argues that each proves descriptively inaccurate when 
compared to the types of harms we regularly allow in the context of free speech 
rights.  
1. Competing Conscience Rights 
Professors Tebbe, Schwartzman, and Schragger argue that “even if some rights 
impose harms on third parties, rights involving claims of conscience are distinctive” 
because “[w]hen third parties complain, their objection is that the state is requiring 
them to subsidize another’s commitments of conscience.”181 Thus, they argue that 
“when religious exemptions generate harms to third parties, there is liberty of 
conscience on both sides.”182 
However, it is not clear that this argument is descriptively accurate in many, if not 
most, cases where third-party harms arise. In Hobby Lobby, there was not a group of 
employees arguing that a religious exemption for Hobby Lobby would violate their 
own conscience.183 Such employees could have sought representation and moved to 
intervene in the dispute to make this argument. Instead, the government was simply 
arguing it should be able to require Hobby Lobby to provide contraception to its 
employees to aid the government’s interest—for nonreligious reasons—in expanding 
contraceptive access.184 Yet proponents of the third-party harm theory still argued 
that such a religious exemption inappropriately burdened these third parties.185 To 
 
 
 177. Harcourt, supra note 20, at 182 (emphasis omitted).  
 178. See Schwartzman et al., supra note 10. 
 179. NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 10, at 201.  
 180. Id. at 200–01. 
 181. Schwartzman et al., supra note 10, at 909. 
 182. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 183. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 184. Id. at 2781. 
 185. See supra Section I.B. 
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provide another example, in the kosher context, non-Jewish inmates are not generally 
complaining about religious accommodations because they do not want to subsidize 
conscience (at least not in typical documents before the courts in those cases). Rather, 
the prison is arguing that a kosher accommodation would take more resources away 
from other inmates.186 No case law requires courts to paternalistically presume that 
any burdened third party has an unspoken conscientious objection to religious 
externalities. If that were the case, it would likely open a Pandora’s Box of claims 
unlike anything we recognize elsewhere in the law. 
Further, it is also not accurate that countervailing conscience concerns are only 
relevant in the religious-accommodations context. Third-party harm theorists state 
that the “challenge for critics of the third-party harm doctrine is to identify cases in 
which there are rights that conflict and in which those cases are relatively easily 
resolved in favor of those imposing on the rights of others.”187 The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Snyder v. Phelps is one example of just such a case.188 There, defendant 
picketers carried hateful signs to protest the funeral of a fallen marine, and they 
defended their actions on free speech grounds, though the plaintiffs’ behavior also 
constituted a religious exercise.189 The plaintiffs, the family of this service member, 
argued that the picketers should not receive First Amendment protection because 
their “conduct interfered with the Snyders’ right to bury their son, a religious 
ceremony entitled to constitutional protection through the First Amendment's Free 
Exercise Clause.”190 The plaintiff also argued that “wholesale promotion of the free 
speech rights of one party without accounting for the free exercise and peaceful 
assembly rights of another has no support in the Constitution.”191 Thus, the plaintiffs 
clearly articulated their competing-conscience rights—even religious-conscience 
rights—that had been harmed as a result of protecting the defendants’ free speech 
rights. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld the free speech rights of the picketers 
and set aside the jury verdict in an 8-1 decision.192  
The normative justification for this decision stems back to the “firmly 
established” principle that “the Constitution applies only to governmental conduct,” 
and “offers no shield against ‘private conduct, “however discriminatory or 
wrongful.”’”193 Thus, while there may be countervailing conscience interests in these 
First Amendment conflicts, only one side of that conflict can lay claim normatively 
 
 
 186. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.  
 187. Schwartzman et al., supra note 10, at 910.  
 188. 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Brief for Petitioner at 56, Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2010) (No. 09-751). 
 191. Id. at 55; see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction 
of Emotional Distress Tort, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 300, 310 (citing Chelsea Brown, 
Note, Not Your Mother's Remedy: A Civil Action Response to the Westboro Baptist Church's 
Military Funeral Demonstrations, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 207, 233 (2009) (“[T]he evaluation of 
the WBC's conduct in a civil action proceeding and the rejection of the Free Exercise Clause 
defense in this case serves to protect the Snyders’ own choice of worship . . . .”)). 
 192. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 443. 
 193. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 507, 509 (1985) 
(quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974)).  
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to the particular harm that arises when it is the government infringing on that 
conscience right. 
2. Dignitary Harm  
Professors NeJaime and Siegel argue that religious exemptions can result in 
unique “dignitary harm” by describing some conduct as “sinful.”194 They note that 
these “dignitary harms” can be particularly hurtful where “one citizen seeks an 
exemption from a legal duty to serve another on the ground that she believes her 
fellow citizen is sinning.”195 
But as Professor Mark Rienzi and I have written elsewhere, society regularly 
countenances nearly identical dignitary harms to protect freedom of speech.196 For 
example, speech protections have been used to protect incredibly hurtful statements 
like signs saying “God Hates You” at the funeral of a marine killed in action. Indeed, 
in terms of condemning someone as “sinful,” the picketers in Snyder actually 
explicitly stated “You’re Going to Hell” on their signs.197 Similarly, in Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale, the Supreme Court allowed an organization to exclude a scout 
master who was a self-professed gay man because the Boy Scouts did not view 
allowing him as a leader as being consistent with their emphasis on being “morally 
straight.”198 It surely inflicted great dignitary harm for this man to be expelled from 
the Boy Scouts. Indeed, unlike in Masterpiece Cakeshop,199 which involved a 
onetime and brief interaction between a store owner and a same-sex couple and only 
implied condemnation of sinful behavior, Dale was expelled from a program that had 
been a major part of his life (for likely as long as he could remember) and involved 
explicit condemnation of his behavior as not “morally straight.”200 Yet the Court held 
that these dignitary harms were insufficient to trump the expressive association rights 
of a private group. 
3. Fraught with Social Meaning 
Professors NeJaime and Siegel also argue that religious exemptions can 
significantly “obstruct the achievement of major social goals” by making claims 
“fraught with . . . powerful social meaning” that are harmful to groups that “the law 
 
 
 194. NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 10, at 199–200. 
 195. Id. at 201; see also NeJaime & Siegel, Religious Exemptions, supra note 9, at 204–05 
(“Going forward, the Court's concern about restraining religious exemptions so that they do 
not inflict material and dignitary harm on those who do not share the objector's beliefs should 
guide not only adjudication, but also the drafting of legislation concerning LGBT equality and 
reproductive healthcare.”). 
 196. See Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 34, at 1623–24 (citing Snyder, 562 U.S. at 448). 
 197. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 454. 
 198. 530 U.S. 640, 650 (2000). 
 199. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n,138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 200. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 650; see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual 
Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 557, 574 (1995) (holding that the exclusion of the LGBT 
group from a private parade was “hurtful,” but still protected). 
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has only recently come to protect.”201 They note that claims concerning “sexual 
norms in long-running political contest” are “fraught with legible and powerful social 
meaning,” including “stigmatizing social meaning” similar to “a dynamic classically 
illustrated by regimes of racial segregation.”202 
But the First Amendment protects speech that makes claims fraught with powerful 
social meaning for groups who have been oppressed in recent history. One example 
comes from National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie,203 where the 
Supreme Court allowed a group of demonstrators wearing Nazi uniforms or 
displaying swastikas to march in Skokie, Illinois—a community with “an unusually 
high percentage of Holocaust survivors.”204 At the time, The New York Times 
reported on how this march “revived the worst agony of our time,” and how no one 
could “underestimate[] the anguish which Nazi uniforms and insignia must cause to 
those who lost families at Dachau and Buchenwald.”205 The harm third parties 
pointed to included emotional harm and anguish caused by the speech. Despite this 
significant harm being inflicted on a subset of the population by the actions of private 
parties and despite the speech being about important social issues aimed at 
individuals who had faced unspeakable wrongs under the Nazi regime, the Court 
upheld the First Amendment rights of the protesters.206  
Similarly, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Supreme Court struck down a law 
under which a teenager who had burned a cross on the lawn of an African-American 
family had been convicted.207 The law in question prohibited “a burning cross or 
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, 
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”208 
Despite the fraught social meaning the government was trying to avoid, particularly 
with the history of racial segregation and despicable threats against racial minorities, 
the Court held that freedom of speech interests prohibited this sort of content-based 
regulation.209 
* * * 
This Section does not argue that dignity interests or competing-conscience 
interests are always legally irrelevant; rather, this Section’s aim is to demonstrate 
that such interests are not unique to the context of religious harm when compared 
 
 
 201. NeJaime & Siegel, Conscience Wars, supra note 10, at 200–01.  
 202. Id. at 201. 
 203. 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam). 
 204. J. Anthony Lukas, The A.C.L.U. Against Itself, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 1978), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1978/07/09/archives/the-aclu-against-itself-aclu-aclu.html 
[https://perma.cc/DS4H-5UHH]; see also Rob Warden, Nazi’s March in Skokie, Ill., Stirs 
Emotion, WASH. POST (June 30, 1977), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics 
/1977/06/30/nazis-march-in-skokie-ill-stirs-emotion/018e1bee-2ca1-4b56-90b8-
3b2ed4471491/ [https://perma.cc/37TA-L9P9].  
 205. Lukas, supra note 204.  
 206. Nat’l Socialist Party, 432 U.S. at 44. 
 207. 505 U.S. 377, 377 (1992). 
 208. Id. at 380. 
 209. Id. at 377. 
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with harms we permit when protecting speech.210 To be sure, sometimes cases 
involving clashes between First Amendment rights and antidiscrimination laws may 
also raise issues beyond expression fraught with social meaning, including access to 
important goods or services. But as Professor Rienzi and I have written elsewhere, 
the Court has provided a framework for dealing with precisely this sort of issue 
regarding access to goods and market failures in the speech context.211 The same 
framework provides a method for dealing with those questions in the religious 
context.  
III. A DESCRIPTIVE FRAMEWORK IDENTIFYING FOUR FIRST AMENDMENT 
CATEGORIES OF HARM  
Given the normative and descriptive shortcomings of the various third-party harm 
theories, it is not surprising that courts are not, in fact, treating the presence of generic 
harm alone as a condition categorically requiring restriction of religious rights. 
Instead, at times courts recognize and allow significant amounts of harm to third 
parties in order to protect every type of First Amendment right—not just religious 
rights. While the presence of “harm” may be a necessary condition for justifying 
government restriction of First Amendment rights, other characteristics are also 
required. What is therefore needed is a careful descriptive analysis of which specific 
types of harm matter to courts, when, and in what ways.  
This Section offers this analysis not just in the context of religious exemptions, 
but more broadly in the First Amendment context, including with respect to freedom 
of speech and the Establishment Clause. This Section also addresses both harms 
caused by private parties, as well as harms caused directly by the government. As 
Professors Holmes and Sunstein explain, the First Amendment prohibits “citizens in 
a multidenominational America” from “acting through the shared instrumentalities 
of their government” to cause harm against other fellow citizens.212 For example, 
protections such as the Establishment Clause were enacted in part to prevent “private 
religious sects” from “employ[ing] the instrumentalities of government to enforce 
their sectarian beliefs on unwilling fellow citizens.”213 Consequently, “[t]o protect 
religious liberty from ‘government interference’ . . . is actually a roundabout way of 
protecting religious liberty from infringement by private parties.”214  
By drawing parallels across different sorts of legal interests and different sorts of 
harms, this Section highlights important repeating patterns critical to understanding 
the nuanced ways that courts classify and weigh different types of harm. Based on 
additional characteristics discussed below that are associated with harm, this Section 
identifies three important categories of harm that arise in the First Amendment 
context: (1) prohibited harm, (2) inadmissible harm, and (3) probative harm.  
 
 
 210. Discussing the ways in which these interests become relevant is an important question 
beyond the scope of this Article.  
 211. Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 34, at 1629–31. 
 212. HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 139, at 184. 
 213. Id.  
 214. Id. Indeed, the “church tax” example that some third-party harm theorists rely on is a 
perfect example of such a phenomenon. 
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The first two categories include harms that courts assess in a more categorical 
manner, whereas the third involves competing harms assessed by courts in an explicit 
balancing framework. Prohibited and inadmissible harms are addressed together in 
Section III.A, as they often operate as mirror images of each other in a categorical 
clash of harms. Prohibited harms include those that the government is not permitted 
to inflict (or allow) regardless of whether the harms are experienced by a discrete 
group or are more broadly dispersed, or whether they are merely de minimis or 
substantial. Conversely, there are some sorts of harms that are inadmissible in the 
First Amendment analysis. It is not that the harms are insufficiently weighty, they 
are simply not relevant to the calculus when considering the weight of harms.  
One way of thinking about inadmissible harms is that such harms are inherent to 
the redistribution of legal interests that was critical to the formation of such a legal 
right to begin with. But some harms are merely incidentally inadmissible by virtue 
of being the bilateral reciprocal externality of a per se prohibited harm. The same is 
true for prohibited harms, in that they can be per se or incidentally impermissible. 
This Section will highlight examples of these categorical harms that exist in free 
speech and free exercise contexts and then address how the same sort of framework 
operates in the Establishment Clause context as well. For example, under the 
Establishment Clause, courts have determined that government interference with 
ecclesiastic decisions regarding internal church governance and leadership is a per 
se prohibited harm.215 Conversely, the reciprocal harm a third party faces by being 
excluded from a certain position becomes incidentally inadmissible, meaning given 
no weight at all in this particular First Amendment calculus. As another example, in 
the free speech context, harm that third parties may face by being offended by speech 
is generally considered a form of per se inadmissible harm.216 Thus, if the 
government can point to no other justification for prohibiting the speech, then the 
reciprocal harms to the speaker of having speech suppressed will become 
incidentally prohibited harms. This Section addressing the prohibited category of 
harms will also discuss Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, a case on which a number of 
third-party harm theorists rely. 
Probative harms are discussed in Part III.B, as these involve competing harms 
being explicitly balanced against each other, typically in a rebuttable presumption 
framework.217 Within the category of probative harms, it is helpful to think of two 
different types of harms that are given different types of weight in the balancing. 
Some classes of probative harms are automatically given a heavy weight, such that 
they give rise to presumptions of impermissibility. This presumption is not, however, 
absolute. Such a presumption can be overcome by the existence of sufficiently 
countervailing probative harms. For example, in the speech or free exercise context, 
courts treat certain defined classes of harm as presumptively impermissible, 
triggering the familiar rebuttable presumption framework of heightened 
constitutional (or statutory) scrutiny. But even where such a presumption arises, 
 
 
 215. See infra Section III.A.3. 
 216. See infra Section III.A.1. 
 217. Of course, courts are engaging in a weighing and balancing of harms to some extent 
for categorical harms too, but they appear to be doing so at the level of deciding which harms 
are categorically weighty enough to constitute prohibited harms and which are simply not the 
type of harms our legal system recognizes.  
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competing relevant harms may, in some instances, rebut presumptively probative 
harms. However, the weight of these relevant harms is context specific and depends 
entirely on the type and magnitude of the harm at issue. And, perhaps notably for 
these sorts of harms, they end up not receiving much weight at all if the government 
has alternatives to avoid these relevant harms without imposing the presumptively 
prohibited harm.  
It is beyond the scope of this Article to assess whether the current doctrinal 
framework used by courts is normatively justified in every respect. However, this 
descriptive framework has important normative implications. A clear understanding 
of the role harm plays in courts’ treatment of various First Amendment rights 
highlights how it is ubiquitous in the law that protection of any such rights inherently 
involves competing harms on both sides of the ledger. Moving beyond a false 
dichotomy of harm versus no harm and more clearly viewing the reciprocal harms 
always at play allows one to ask much more fruitful normative questions about harm, 
discussed below in Part IV. 
A. Prohibited and Inadmissible Harms 
1. Free Speech  
In the free speech context, harm that third parties experience in the form of mere 
offense to speech is per se inadmissible. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed 
this principle, explaining that “offensiveness was ‘classically not [a] justification[n] 
validating the suppression of expression protected by the First Amendment.’”218Any 
other result would “effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a 
matter of personal predilections.”219 In other words, courts treat the harm of offense 
as inadmissible when determining whether to protect speech, because otherwise 
speech protections would fail to exist in any meaningful sense.  
Thus, if the government can point to no other justification for prohibiting the 
speech than the inadmissible harm of offense, then the reciprocal harms to the 
speaker of having speech suppressed will become incidentally prohibited harms. The 
Supreme Court has stated, “time and again that ‘the public expression of ideas may 
not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their 
hearers.’”220 The government may be able to engage in that same burden to speech 
 
 
 218. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 (1983) (alteration in original); 
see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (“We have said time and again that ‘the 
public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves 
offensive to some of their hearers.’”) (citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)); 
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 
(1991) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)) (“[T]he fact that 
society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is 
the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it 
constitutional protection.”); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (listing cases where 
courts have not allowed government to prohibit expression “simply because society finds the 
idea itself offensive or disagreeable”). 
  219. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). 
 220. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 
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for other justifications, but so long as that harm is merely the bilateral reciprocal 
externality of avoiding offense to third parties, it becomes incidentally prohibited.  
The Supreme Court has recognized other sorts of per se inadmissible harms in the 
free speech context as well. Specifically, the harm a speaker experiences from their 
speech being burdened is inadmissible when the expression at issue falls within 
certain “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech.”221 These classes 
include things like incitement to illegal action, true threats of violence, obscenity, 
and child pornography.222 The justification for treating the harm to the speaker as 
inadmissible in these contexts is that the countervailing harm of the speech to third 
parties is too great to entitle the speech to special First Amendment protection. These 
classes of speech operate as categorical exceptions to the rule that would otherwise 
consider such harm to the speaker to be quite weighty—indeed, a presumptive harm, 
as discussed below. 
2. Religious Exercise 
Where private parties have claimed that religious expression harms them because 
the practice is insulting or disturbing to their religion, the Supreme Court has treated 
this sort of harm as per se inadmissible. In other words, if the government can point 
to no other justification for prohibiting the religious conduct than the inadmissible 
harm of religious insult, then the reciprocal harms to the religious observer will 
become incidentally prohibited harms.223 For example, in Cantwell v. State of 
 
 
576, 592 (1969)) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that 
the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the 
idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” (quoting Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414)); see also Hustler 
Magazine, 485 U.S. at 55–56 (1988); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971); 
Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509–14 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965); Edwards v. 
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237–38 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949); 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 
(1939); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937). 
 221. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). 
 222. See, e.g., J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson ed., 1962) 
(discussing speech acts); L.W. SUMNER, THE HATEFUL AND THE OBSCENE: STUDIES IN THE 
LIMITS OF FREE EXPRESSION (2004) (discussing obscenity); DWIGHT L. TEETER & BILL 
LOVING, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS: FREEDOM AND CONTROL OF PRINT AND BROADCAST 
MEDIA 121 (12th ed., Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press 2008) (discussing fighting words); 
Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1143 (2005) (noting that 
“threats or false statements of fact” have “so little First Amendment value that [they are] 
constitutionally unprotected”).  
 223. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 292 (1951) (invalidating a permit scheme which 
had been used to revoke a preacher’s permit “based on evidence that he had ridiculed and 
denounced other religious beliefs in his meetings”); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303 (1940); see also 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 497 (1952) (striking down a statute in New York 
that permitted “the banning of motion picture films on the ground that they are 
‘sacrilegious’”); Volokh, supra note 191, at 310 (“If the tendency of speech to emotionally 
disturb a plaintiff for religious reasons, and affect the spiritual or emotional value that a 
plaintiff gets from a religious service, suffices to justify restricting speech, then half-century-
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Connecticut, Newton Cantwell, a Jehovah’s Witness, stopped two other men on the 
street and asked and received permission to play a record for them, which went on to 
criticize the Catholic Church.224 The two men were themselves Catholic, and they 
became “incensed by the contents of the record.”225 As a result, charges were brought 
against Cantwell, and he was convicted for inciting a breach of the peace, among 
other convictions.226 The Court unanimously held that this conviction “must be set 
aside” because “a State may not unduly suppress free communication of views, 
religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions.”227 Thus, the 
harm the government caused for religious observers was prohibited, and the harm 
the Catholic men claimed experiencing, undesirable religious activity, was per se 
inadmissible.  
Similarly, in 1952 the Supreme Court struck down a statute in New York that 
permitted “the banning of motion picture films on the ground that they are 
‘sacrilegious.’”228 The highest court in New York upheld the statute, reasoning that 
the government could act to avoid harm to third parties that included their religion 
being “treated with contempt, mockery, scorn and ridicule.”229 The Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed, holding that this standard “is set adrift upon a boundless sea 
amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views, with no charts but those 
provided by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies.”230 The Court went on to 
explain that “the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from 
views distasteful to them . . . . It is not the business of government in our nation to 
suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine . . . .”231 
Lest one think that such inadmissible and prohibited harms are obvious in the free 
exercise context, it is valuable to consider a very different approach that Europe’s 
highest human rights court has taken. In a recent ruling, the European Court of 
Human Rights held that disparagement of religious doctrines, such as insulting the 
Prophet Muhammad, is a harm that can justify prosecution by the government.232 In 
this particular Austrian case, a woman had been convicted under a law that prohibited 
 
 
old precedents protecting blasphemous and otherwise religiously offensive speech . . . would 
have to be overturned. And religious ideologies would acquire striking, and improper, new 
protection from criticism and ridicule.”). 
 224. 310 U.S. at 303. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 300. 
 227. Id. at 307–08.  
 228. Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 497. 
 229. Id. at 504 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 101 N.E.2d 665, 672 (N.Y. 1951)).  
 230. Id. at 504–505.  
 231. Id. at 505 (emphasis added). The Court here discussed concerns regarding this policy 
under the religion clauses of the First Amendment, but it ultimately determined it only needed 
to decide the case under the Free Speech Clause. Id. at 502. However, the Supreme Court later 
affirmed this reasoning, quoting from this passage, in the context of religious protections under 
the First Amendment. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106–07 (1968). 
 232. Bojan Pancevski, Europe Court Upholds Ruling Against Woman Who Insulted Islam, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2018, 2:57 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/europe-court-upholds-
ruling-against-women-who-insulted-islam-1540580231?mod=hp_lead_pos9 
[https://perma.cc/VA5A-HXY6]. 
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religious disparagement after she called the Prophet Muhammad a pedophile.233 The 
European Court of Human Rights held that Austrian courts “carefully balanced her 
right to freedom of expression with the right of others to have their religious feelings 
protected, and served the legitimate aim of preserving religious peace in Austria.”234 
Other countries have engaged in even more extreme prosecution of harm caused by 
religious disparagement with blasphemy laws. These approaches used in other 
countries highlight the distinctive way in which U.S. courts have chosen to treat 
disparagement harms as inadmissible, rather than a relevant factor to be balanced.235 
3. Establishment Clause  
This subsection discusses two harms courts have treated as categorically 
prohibited under the Establishment Clause: coerced conformance with religious 
tenets and government interference with internal church governance and leadership, 
along with some of the inadmissible harms in those cases. 
a. Coerced Conformance with Religious Tenets 
One per se inadmissible harm in the Establishment Clause context includes the 
claim by religious individuals that the government’s failure to coerce conformance 
with religious practices would allow private behavior that “contradicts accepted 
social, moral or religious ideas.”236 If the government can point to no other 
justification for its policy other than that inadmissible harm, then any harms flowing 
from giving the force of law to coerce certain religious doctrines or teachings become 
incidentally prohibited harm.237 
 
 
 233. Id.  
 234. Id.  
 235. For a discussion of the differences between categoricalism and balancing, see Joseph 
Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 375 (2009). 
 236. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107 n.15 (quoting Robert A. Leflar, Legal Liability for the 
Exercise of Free Speech, 10 ARK. L. REV. 155, 158 (1956)) (addressing a challenge to a law 
prohibiting teachers from instructing students about the theory of evolution). 
 237. Third-party harm theorists have observed that there is “broad consensus that, whatever 
else it was originally understood to accomplish, the Establishment Clause was meant to 
prohibit the federal government from setting up any ‘establishment of religion’ that resembled 
the eighteenth-century Church of England.” Gedicks & Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions, supra 
note 10, at 362 (citing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 32 (1998); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS 
NEUTRALITY 82 (2013); STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE 23 (1995); JOHN WITTE, 
JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 89 (3d 
ed. 2011); Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 346, 388–89 (2002); Kent Greenawalt, Common Sense About Original and Subsequent 
Understandings of the Religion Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479, 488, 491 (2006)). Prior to 
American Independence, “the Church of England was formally established by law in the five 
[American] colonies . . . .” Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at 
the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2110 (2003). 
The remaining colonies did not have established churches, and they were relatively religiously 
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For example, in a Kansas court of appeals case called Sharma v. Sharma, a 
husband had brought a divorce action which the wife objected to on the grounds that 
the couple were Hindus and their religion “does not recognize divorce.”238 She 
argued that an “order dissolving her marriage violates her constitutionally guaranteed 
right of free exercise of religion.”239 The court disagreed and noted that compelling 
the husband to remain married would be to coerce him to comply with his wife’s 
religious belief rather than his own.240 This sort of harm the husband would 
experience “is prohibited by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”241 
The court recognized potential harm the wife could experience because the husband 
contravened religious vows he had made, but it also noted that such harm was per se 
inadmissible under the Establishment Clause. “Any transgression by her husband of 
their ecclesiastical vows, is, in this instance, outside the jurisdiction of the court.”242 
The Supreme Court engaged in similar reasoning in the education context. In 
Epperson v. Arkansas, the State passed a law that prevented its teachers from 
teaching the theory of evolution “because it is contrary to the belief of some that the 
Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of man.”243 
The Court observed that the State’s actions resulted in harm for teachers and students 
by “requir[ing] that teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or 
prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma.”244 The Court ruled that coercing a 
teacher to tailor her teaching to a certain “sect or dogma” constituted prohibited 
harm.245 This was because the harm that the State alleged citizens would experience 
if teachers could teach theories that contradict “accepted social, moral or religious 
ideas” was simply a form of per se inadmissible harm.246 The Court explained that 
“the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views 
distasteful to them.”247 Since the State could point to no other harm than this 
inadmissible one to justify its policy, the reciprocal coercive harm was prohibited.  
Another case, Caldor, deserves mention here given third-party harm theorists 
reliance on it.248 The Burger Court’s reasoning in Caldor is not a model of clarity. 
 
 
tolerant and pluralistic. Id. at 2110–11 (“The remaining colonies—Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
New Jersey, Rhode Island, and non-metropolitan New York—had no official establishment of 
religion. Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and Maryland were explicitly founded as havens for 
dissenters, though Maryland lost that status at the end of the 1600s. Although the laws of these 
colonies would not pass full muster under modern notions of the separation of church and 
state—they all had religious tests for office, blasphemy laws, and the like—they were, by the 
standards of the day, religiously tolerant and pluralistic.”). 
 238. 667 P.2d 395, 395 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983). 
 239. Id.  
 240. Id. at 396. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Williams v. Williams, 543 P.2d 1401, 1403 (Okla. 
1975)). 
 243. 393 U.S. 97, 107–09 (1968). 
 244. Id. at 106. 
 245. Id. (emphasizing that “[t]his prohibition is absolute”). 
 246. Id. at 107 n. 115 (quoting Leflar, supra note 237, at 158).  
 247. Id. at 107 (emphasis added) (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 
505 (1952)).  
 248. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 708 (1985). 
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The language of the opinion, as well as subsequent cases discussing Caldor, suggest 
that it was decided under the Court’s Lemon precedent249—precedent that at least six 
justices recently indicated they no longer view as good law.250 As discussed in more 
detail below in Section III.B.2, this legal standard is thus dubious precedent under 
the Establishment Clause. Nevertheless, to the extent that it remains good law, one 
reading of Caldor is that it fits within this categorical class of Establishment Clause 
cases regarding government coercion and religious tenants. In Caldor, the Court 
struck down a broad, generally applicable Connecticut law that required employers 
to allow an employee to not work on his chosen Sabbath day.251 Caldor involves 
coercion in the sense that the law at issue in that case is (1) a government requirement 
or prohibition that (2) falls on a private party and (3) compels that private party to 
change their behavior so that other third parties can engage in their desired religious 
practices more easily.  
One way to think of Caldor is that the government action is quasi-coercive 
because it does not directly require the private actor to engage in a religious practice. 
But it does require, through the force of law, that private individuals change their 
behavior so that someone else may engage in a religious practice. Indeed, the Court 
observed with concern that this law at issue in Caldor created an “absolute duty to 
conform [the private] business practices to the particular religious practices of the 
employee by enforcing observance of the Sabbath the employee unilaterally 
designates.”252 This, the Court held, contravened a requirement of the Establishment 
 
 
 249. In Caldor, the law required employers to accommodate employees’ Sabbath 
observance, but it did not require employers to accommodate a host of other sorts of religious 
practices. The majority stated that its holding “relied on . . . Lemon” for “guidance,” noting 
the need for a law to avoid the “primary effect” of “advanc[ing] or inhibit[ing] religion.” Id. 
Similarly, in her concurrence, Justice O’Connor stated, “The Court applies the test enunciated 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, and concludes that [the law] has a primary effect that impermissibly 
advances religion. . . . [T]he Connecticut Sabbath law has an impermissible effect because it 
conveys a message of endorsement of the Sabbath observance.” Id. at 711 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has subsequently affirmed that this issue 
of impermissible purpose under Lemon was the basis for its holding in Caldor. Hobbie v. 
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 145 n.11 (1987) (“In Thornton, we held that 
a Connecticut statute that provided employees with an absolute right not to work on their 
Sabbath violated the Establishment Clause. The Court determined that the State's ‘unyielding 
weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests . . . ha[d] a primary effect that 
impermissibly advance[d] a particular religious practice.’”) (alterations in original). Professor 
Eugene Volokh has described Caldor as falling under the “impermissible primary effects” 
prong of the Lemon test. EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES: 
PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 727 (6th ed. 2016). 
 250. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019). Justice Alito (joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer) criticized Lemon in the context of symbol cases. Id. 
at 2085. Justice Gorsuch suggested that Lemon is effectively “shelved.” Id. at 2098 (Gorsuch, 
J., concurring). Justice Kavanaugh stated that “[American Legion] again makes clear that the 
Lemon test does not apply to Establishment Clause cases.” Id. at 2092 (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring). And Justice Thomas went as far to say that the Court should “overrule the Lemon 
test in all contexts.” Id. at 2095 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 251. Caldor, 472 U.S. at 708. 
 252. Id. at 709. 
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Clause that “government . . . must take pains not to compel people to act in the name 
of any religion.”253 
Because of this quasi-coercive element, as opposed to a fully coercive element 
(requiring the individual himself to conform behavior with a religious tenet), it 
seemed to matter to the Court whether there were strict limits on the level of 
government coercion. And in Caldor, the law failed to place any reasonable limit on 
the externalities that would result from the government coercion, which was why the 
Supreme Court noted with concern the “absolute and unqualified” religious 
accommodation requirement resulted in an “absolute duty to conform . . . business 
practices to the particular religious practices of the employee by enforcing 
observance of the Sabbath the employee unilaterally designates.”254 In contrast to 
those in Caldor, other sorts of quasi-coercive government action likely do not fall 
within this prohibited category of harm where limits are placed on the government 
coercion. Title VII’s religious discrimination prohibition is a good example of a 
quasi-coercive government action that likely satisfies Establishment Clause 
concerns.255 The statute does require employers to change their behavior to 
accommodate employees’ religious beliefs. But it limits the level of religious-
benefitting coercion that can be exercised against an employer by capping any 
accommodations that would rise to the level of creating “undue hardship” on the 
conduct of the employer's business.256 Thus, under Title VII, private parties are 
spared from experiencing limitless coercion in order to benefit private parties’ 
religious practices. 
Notably, as other scholars have observed,257 true religious exemptions from 
government requirements never involve this quasi-coercive problem, where the 
government imposes a requirement or prohibition directly on a private party in order 
to benefit religious individuals. Instead, a religious exemption involves (1) a 
government requirement or prohibition that (2) applies to a range of groups and 
 
 
 253. Id. at 708. 
 254. Id. at 709. 
 255. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 256. Caldor, 472 U.S. at 712 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 257. See generally Esbeck, supra note 14. As these scholars have recognized, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Amos regarding the statutory exemption in Title VII also illustrates how 
such exemptions do not result in quasi-coercive government action. See Corp. of Presiding 
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 327–28 (1987). 
Employees who had been fired from their jobs with a religious organization brought suit, 
arguing that the statutory religious exemption violated the Establishment Clause because it 
“singles out religious entities for a benefit.” Id. at 333. Notably, these employees constitute a 
discrete and identifiable group of third parties who experienced more than a de minimis harm 
from the religious exemption. Yet the Supreme Court unanimously rejected their argument. 
The Court concluded that the “government acts with [a] proper purpose” when it “lift[s] a 
regulation that burdens the exercise of religion,” even if the exemption does not “come 
packaged with benefits to secular entities.” Id. at 338. The Court also observed the difference 
between a burden imposed on a private party directly by the government and one imposed 
incidentally by virtue of private actors who received a religious exemption stating, 
“Undoubtedly, [the employee’s] freedom of choice in religious matters was impinged upon, 
but it was the Church (through the [church policies]), and not the Government, who put him 
to the choice of changing his religious practices or losing his job.” Id. at 337–38, 338 n.15. 
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individuals but (3), for free exercise reasons, is not being applied against particular 
religious individuals. Such exemptions will have incidental impacts on third parties 
(as does the protection of any legal right or interest), but there is no direct government 
coercion operating through the force of law against nonbenefiting private parties in 
order to benefit religious individuals.258 In Hobby Lobby (citing Cutter),259 the 
Supreme Court did discuss the interplay between Establishment Clause concerns 
under Caldor and heightened scrutiny analysis in the context of religious 
exemptions; this interplay is discussed in the context of relevant harms below in 
Section III.B. 
b. Government Interference with Internal Church Governance and Leadership 
Another sort of per se prohibited harm in the Establishment Clause context occurs 
when the government interferes with ecclesiastic decisions regarding internal church 
governance and leadership.260 On the other side of the ledger in such conflicts, a 
private party experiences the harm of being excluded from a group or employment 
position. Such a harm is not categorically inadmissible; indeed, courts have ruled in 
favor of preventing such harm elsewhere.261 But it becomes incidentally inadmissible 
when the competing harm is categorically prohibited: government interference with 
church leadership. 
The leading case addressing this conflict is Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & School v. EEOC, where the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the 
discrimination claim of a former teacher challenging her church’s decision to fire 
her.262 The Court also acknowledged that there were countervailing harms on each 
side of the scale, including the “important” interest of society “in the enforcement of 
employment discrimination statutes,” to protect third parties like the teacher on the 
one hand, and “the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their 
beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission” on the other side.263 But instead 
 
 
 258. To provide an example, for Hobby Lobby to have truly involved a quasi-coercive 
government action and mirrored Caldor, it would have needed to involve a scenario similar to 
the following: an employee who worked for a company objected on religious grounds to being 
offered company insurance with contraception in it and demanded under a religious 
accommodation law that the employer exclude contraception coverage from its plan, even if 
that went against the preferences or needs of the employer and other employees. Of course, 
the Supreme Court’s actual decision in Hobby Lobby looked nothing like that. See Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). Instead, when the Supreme Court exempted 
Hobby Lobby from the contraception mandate, it did not place any government-imposed 
requirement, penalty, or barrier with respect to contraception on any private parties. It simply 
removed a government requirement that had previously applied to Hobby Lobby. Id. 
 259. Id. at 2761 (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715–16 (2005)). 
 260. For a thoughtful discussion about when religious autonomy causes cognizable harm, 
see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 
BYU L. REV. 1789, 1856, 1856 n. 266, 1858 (discussing sex abuse cases). 
 261. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (ruling in favor of women who were 
excluded from associating with the Jaycees).  
 262. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012). 
 263. Id. at 196.  
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of engaging in any sort of comparative balancing of these harms, the Court stated 
that “the First Amendment has struck the balance for us.”264 That balance 
categorically required a ruling avoiding the prohibited harm to the church, and 
treating the bilateral reciprocal externality befalling the teacher as incidentally 
inadmissible. 
B. Probative Harms  
1. Free Speech and Religious Exercise 
The framework for assessing competing probative harms is relatively 
straightforward and similar in both the free speech and the statutory religious 
exemption contexts.265 In both contexts, a presumptively impermissible harm arises 
when government action burdens either protected speech or religious exercise rights, 
respectively. The tests vary for determining which harms qualify for this 
classification as a presumptive harm. But once the relevant harm has occurred, that 
government action is impermissible unless that presumption is rebutted by the 
presence of sufficient countervailing and unavoidable harms. The weight of the 
presumption varies somewhat, depending on whether the doctrinal context of the 
right triggers intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny. The important point is that 
unlike with truly prohibited harms, here the government may rebut such a 
presumption based on other relevant factors. One such rebutting factor involves other 
relevant probative harm to third parties that will result unless the government is 
allowed to engage in the presumptive harm to the speech or religious interest. 
However, these competing harms will not be given much weight at all if the 
government has alternatives to avoid these relevant harms without imposing the 
presumptively prohibited harm. 
One of many examples of this analysis in the speech context comes from Bartnicki 
v. Vopper, where the Court dealt with the question of whether a federal wiretap law 
could be used to punish the publication of an illegally intercepted cellular telephone 
call.266 The Court there noted that the government interception resulted in harm to 
the speaker’s rights to be able to publicize information. This harm was presumptively 
impermissible. The government argued that it had an interest in punishing the 
publication of the communication to “minimiz[e] the harm to persons whose 
conversations have been illegally intercepted.”267 This countervailing harm was 
 
 
 264. Id. Note that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor was under both the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. Id. at 181 (“Both Religion Clauses bar the 
government from interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its 
ministers.”). 
 265. Note that for the religious exercise context, I will be pointing to cases decided both 
constitutionally and statutorily under RFRA, as RFRA operates as a quasi-constitutional 
statute that was meant in part to restore the constitutional heightened scrutiny that existed prior 
to Employment Division v. Smith. I have argued elsewhere why Smith is an inappropriate 
constitutional standard for religious exemptions and will thus not attempt to fit Smith into a 
coherent harm framework here. See generally Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 34. 
 266. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517 (2001). 
 267. Id. at 529.  
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relevant. Despite the government’s asserted interest in reducing substantial harm to 
identifiable third parties, the Court held that this argument was insufficient to rebut 
the presumption of impermissibility.268 The government had other ways to protect 
third parties, including by punishing parties more directly tied to the interception of 
the communication.269 A contrasting case is Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
where the Court acknowledged that the government had engaged in serious 
presumptive harm by passing a statute that allowed even political speech to be 
prohibited by the government in order to avoid providing support to terrorist 
organizations.270 However, the relevant harm in that case, including injury to third 
parties from terrorist organizations, was sufficient to rebut the presumption of 
impermissibility.271 The Court left open the possibility, however, that such relevant 
harms to third parties from terrorist activity would not be sufficient to rebut the 
presumption in other contexts.272 
This same sort of analysis applies in the context of general exemption statutes for 
religious rights.273 For example, in Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court found that 
RFRA gave rise to presumptively impermissible harm where the government 
substantially burdened Hobby Lobby’s religious exercise with respect to 
contraception, thus creating a rebuttable presumption.274 On the other side of the 
ledger, the Court assessed harm that would befall third parties—employees of Hobby 
Lobby—if the Court offered a religious exemption and these employees did not 
receive seamless contraception access. Ultimately, the Court determined that this 
relevant harm was insufficient to rebut the presumption of impermissible government 
burdening of religious exercise rights.275 The Court’s conclusion was driven by its 
determination that the government had other alternatives to avoid harm to Hobby 
Lobby’s employees while also avoiding the presumptive harm of burdening religious 
exercise rights.276 
In the free exercise context, United States v. Lee is a case where the Court held 
that the harms to third parties were such that the government was able to satisfy strict 
scrutiny and thus overcome the presumptive harm that befell an Amish employer 
theologically opposed to paying Social Security tax.277 
A brief word about the Establishment Clause limits on religious exemptions is 
relevant here, though other Establishment Clause harms will be discussed in more 
detail below. Some scholars argue that the harm Hobby Lobby’s employees would 
 
 
 268. Id. at 535. 
 269. Id. at 529. 
 270. 561 U.S. 1, at 25 (2010). 
 271. Id. at 30. 
 272. Id. at 40 (the Court made clear that its holding only applied to “the particular forms 
of support that plaintiffs seek to provide to foreign terrorist organizations”).  
 273. See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
429 (2006) (noting that the rebuttable presumption in this case “is placed squarely on the 
Government by RFRA rather than the First Amendment, but the consequences are the same”) 
(citation omitted). 
 274. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014). 
 275. Id. at 2780–82 
 276. Id. at 2782. 
 277. 455 U.S. 252, 259–60 (1982). 
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experience as a result of the religious exemption should operate as essentially a form 
of prohibited harm under the Establishment Clause.278 The Court rejected this 
approach, and instead noted that this third-party harm was a relevant harm, entitled 
to probative weight under the Establishment Clause no greater than the normal 
probative weight it would be given under the rebuttable presumption framework of 
heightened scrutiny.279 Specially, the Court cited some Establishment Clause cases 
and noted that “[i]t is certainly true that in applying RFRA ‘courts must take adequate 
account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on 
nonbeneficiaries.’”280 But the Court stated that such “consideration will often inform 
the analysis of the Government’s compelling interest and the availability of a less 
restrictive means of advancing that interest” under strict scrutiny.281 Thus, whatever 
consideration must be given to relevant harms caused to nonbeneficiaries by 
statutory general religious exemptions, that analysis is likely automatically baked 
into the strict scrutiny analysis of general accommodation statutes like RFRA and 
RLUIPA. Such relevant harm does not appear to receive additional weight based on 
Establishment Clause considerations. 
2. Establishment Clause  
In some Establishment Clause contexts, such as with regard to government 
discrimination between religious congregations, courts have explicitly followed a 
rebuttable presumption framework of competing harms similar to the speech and 
religious exercise context.282 On the other hand, the Supreme Court’s infamous 
Lemon test sometimes has seemed to just be looking at a series of relevant harms 
with no clear guidance as to how to balance the harms against one another or what 
respective weights various harms should receive. The Lemon test looks at whether 
the statute has a secular purpose, whether its primary effect is to “endorse” religion, 
and whether it fosters excessive entanglement.283 The Court, however, recently 
rejected and heavily criticized the application of Lemon in its American Legion 
ruling.284 
 
 
 278. See supra Section I.B. 
 279. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781, 2781 n.37. 
 280. Id. at 2801 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005)). 
 281. Id. at 2781. 
 282. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). Commentators such as Professor 
Fallon have noted a deep incongruence between the Court’s jurisprudence regarding standing 
and other constitutional doctrines and have argued for Establishment Clause jurisprudence to 
be brought more in line with other First Amendment jurisprudence. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 59 (2017) (“When compared with 
other constitutional doctrines, Establishment Clause doctrine is confused and anomalous, both 
substantively and with regard to standing.”). 
 283. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993) 
(describing Lemon test); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688–89 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (articulating the “no endorsement” test).  
 284.  Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2080 (2019) (“If the Lemon 
Court thought that its test would provide a framework for all future Establishment Clause 
decisions, its expectation has not been met. In many cases, this Court has either expressly 
declined to apply the test or has simply ignored it. . . . This pattern is a testament to the Lemon 
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Careful review of some of the Court’s previous cases ostensibly applying Lemon 
suggests that these cases may be actually following something closer to the rebuttable 
presumption framework used elsewhere in the First Amendment. Some harms are 
treated as presumptively invalid under the Establishment Clause when they resemble 
a historic hallmark of establishment, such as those identified by Professor Michael 
McConnell,285 and when the government is engaging in some sort of preferential 
treatment with regard to religion.286 As discussed below, these sorts of harms include 
preferential public funding to religious groups and preferential partnerships with 
religious organizations for the performance of state civil functions. Viewing courts’ 
treatment of harm under the Establishment Clause in this light can lend more 
predictability and coherence to the analysis in which courts are engaging. 
The public financial support of religious groups is one Establishment Clause area 
where the rebuttable presumption framework is also consistent with historical 
concerns regarding an established religion. As Professor McConnell has recognized, 
public financial support is one of the hallmarks of a historic establishment of 
religion.287 Historically, public financial support does not appear to have been viewed 
as a categorically prohibited harm, as many forms of financial support appear to have 
received wide acceptance in early American history.288 To take one particularly 
relevant example, our country has a long history of providing tax exemptions for 
religious groups,289 which necessarily results in cost-shifting for religious practices 
to nonbelievers. There are no meaningful differences between a church tax or a 
church tax exemption in terms of pure cost shifting and externalities for third 
parties—the issue at the heart of the third-party harm theory. As Professor Wolfman 
has explained, a “tax expenditure” can “appropriate money to a particular person or 
group” where there is “a special, narrowly directed tax deduction or exclusion.”290 
But where public support was provided to religious organizations in preferential 
ways, such as the Virginia church tax that Mark Storslee has recently analyzed, then 
such costs were viewed with much greater historical concern.291 
 
 
test’s shortcomings. As Establishment Clause cases involving a great array of laws and 
practices came to the Court, it became more and more apparent that the Lemon test could not 
resolve them.”). 
 285. See McConnell, supra note 237, at 2110. 
 286.  See Stephanie H. Barclay, Brady Earley & Annika Boone, Original Meaning and the 
Establishment Clause: A Corpus Linguistic Analysis, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 505 (2019) (providing 
data on how frequently historic terms discussing an established religion referred to these 
different hallmarks of an establishment). 
 287. McConnell, supra note 237, at 2146. 
 288. Id. at 2147–48. For a discussion of additional characteristics of public funding that 
raised concerns about an establishment of religion during the founding period, see Barclay et 
al., supra note 285.  
 289. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970).  
 290. Bernard Wolfman, Tax Expenditures: From Idea to Ideology, 99 HARV. L. REV. 491, 
491–492 (1985) (book review).  
 291. Storslee, supra note 15, at 887; see also Barclay et al., supra note 285 (explaining 
how historic sources in the corpus linguistic analysis never treated public funding, alone, as 
equating with an established religion; rather, each surveyed source involved preferential 
treatment of at least one religious group with respect to the funding). 
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The rebuttable presumption framework provides the most coherent account of 
courts’ decisions in the public funding context as well. Where public funding is being 
offered to religious groups on neutral terms available to other religious and secular 
groups alike, no presumptive harm arises. But when public aid is being offered in a 
more preferential manner, a rebuttable presumption of impermissibility arises that 
can be rebutted based on a showing of a need to avoid the competing harm of 
government entanglement with religious affairs.  
For example, in the context of taxes, Professor Zelinsky has astutely observed that 
“taxing [churches] does not separate church and state but, rather, enmeshes them. . . 
. The relationship between the tax collector and the taxpayer is among the most 
enmeshing legal relationships in our society.”292 Professor Zelinsky describes 
“enforcement entanglement” as the entanglement that occurs when government taxes 
churches and is therefore required to value church property, place liens on church 
property, and (in some cases) foreclose on church property.293 In Walz v. 
Commissioner, for instance, the Supreme Court rejected an Establishment Clause 
challenge to New York’s property tax exemption for church property.294 In an 
opinion joined by six Justices, Chief Justice Burger wrote that the tax exemption was 
a permissible means of “avoid[ing] excessive entanglement” and “prevent[ing] the 
kind of involvement that would tip the balance toward government control of 
churches or governmental restraint on religious practice.”295 Given the “autonomy 
and freedom of religious bodies,” it was reasonable for the state to conclude that such 
organizations “should not be inhibited in their activities by property taxation or the 
hazard of loss of those properties for nonpayment of taxes.”296  
While the entanglement concern constituted the core of Justice Burger’s opinion, 
he also touched on the subtheme of government evenhandedness. He noted that New 
York’s exemption for religious organizations was part of a broad tax scheme that 
included other exemptions for “a broad class of property” including for groups like 
“hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic 
groups.”297 New York’s policy thus did not just exempt “churches as such,” but 
instead had a policy recognizing many “groups as beneficial and stabilizing 
influences in community life.”298 Professor Zelinsky has suggested that these 
comments reflect “greater judicial acceptance of tax exemptions for churches and 
other religious institutions when exemption simultaneously extends as well to secular 
philanthropic activities and entities.”299 Another way to think about this 
presumptively impermissible harm of preferential tax treatment in favor of some 
 
 
 292. EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, TAXING THE CHURCH: RELIGION, EXEMPTIONS, 
ENTANGLEMENT, AND THE CONSTITUTION 234–35 (2017).  
 293. Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Religious Tax Exemptions Entangle in Violation of the 
Establishment Clause? The Constitutionality of the Parsonage Allowance Exclusion and the 
Religious Exemptions of the Individual Health Care Mandate and the FICA and Self-
Employment Taxes, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1633, 1640 (2012). 
 294. Walz, 397 U.S. at 680.  
 295. Id. at 670.  
 296. Id. at 672. 
 297. Id. at 673.  
 298. Id.  
 299. ZELINSKY, supra note 292, at 6. 
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religious organizations may be rebutted in some instances where entanglement 
concerns would arise without such a tax exemption. But some preferential tax 
treatment of religious organizations, such as in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 
actually creates heightened entanglement concerns and thus fails to rebut the 
presumption of impermissibility.300 
The flip side of this Establishment Clause analysis illustrates a mirror rebuttable 
presumption framework that takes place under the Free Exercise Clause with regard 
to denials of public support singling out religious organizations. Specifically, when 
government denies public support in a targeted, discriminatory way toward religious 
groups, a presumption of impermissibility arises.301 Such a presumption may be 
rebutted where the funding at issue would be directed to a religious activity and 
where there has been a “history” of government entanglement.302 But absent this 
specific history of entanglement, the presumptively impermissible discriminatory 
denial will not be rebutted. For example, in Trinity Lutheran, the Supreme Court 
recently struck down a state grant program that excluded religious organizations.303 
The Court indicated that the State might have been able to rebut the presumption of 
impermissibility for its exclusion of religious groups from public funding if such an 
exclusion had arisen in one of the “few areas” where the state has an 
“antiestablishment interest” in preventing funding for “essentially religious 
endeavors”—an interest which is at the “historic core of the Religious Clauses.”304 
But absent that sort of core interest, the State would be unable to rebut a presumption 
of impermissibility for its discriminatory actions. 
 
 
 300. 489 U.S. 1 (1989). Professor Zelinsky labels the entanglement issue in this case as 
“borderline entanglement,” referring to the entanglement that occurs when government must 
police the boundaries of who qualifies for an exemption and assessment of specific religious 
activities. ZELINSKY, supra note 292, at xv (“I propose the label ‘borderline entanglement’ for 
the church-state tussles which occur when churches and other sectarian actors are tax exempt. 
When churches (and other religious entities and actors) are tax exempt, they must claim 
exemption while tax collectors must police the boundaries of exemption and sometimes reject 
those claims. The upshot is church-state entanglement over the borders of exemption.”). The 
State in Texas Monthly had a sales tax which applied to all secular publications, but it 
exempted “[p]eriodicals that are published or distributed by a religious faith and that consist 
wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of the faith and books that consist wholly of 
writings sacred to a religious faith.” Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5 (quoting TEX. TAX CODE 
ANN. § 151.312 (West 1982)). In Justice Brennan’s opinion, joined by Justices Marshall and 
Stevens, he noted the borderline entanglement problem inherent in such an exemption, as it 
“requires that public officials determine whether some message or activity is consistent with 
‘the teaching of the faith.’” Id. at 20. Thus, while Justice Brennan noted that taxing churches 
would also “enmesh the operations of church and state to some degree,” enforcing this type of 
subsidy which is “targeted at writings that promulgate the teachings of religious faiths,” 
“appears, on its face, to produce greater state entanglement with religion than the denial of an 
exemption.” Id. at 15, 20–21 (emphasis omitted). 
 301. See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 
(2017) (“Trinity Lutheran is a member of the community too, and the State’s decision to 
exclude it for purposes of this public program must withstand the strictest scrutiny.”). 
 302. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004). 
 303. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2012. 
 304. Id. at 2023 (citations omitted). 
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IV. THE NORMATIVE QUESTIONS WE SHOULD BE ASKING ABOUT HARM 
As discussed in Part III, careful review of religious exemption caselaw reveals 
that courts are not treating any harm to third parties as categorically prohibited. 
Rather, at times, courts recognize and allow significant amounts of harm to third 
parties in order to protect every type of First Amendment right—not just religious 
rights. And competing harms always arise in the context of the protection of such 
rights. A clear recognition of the ubiquitous nature of reciprocal harm inherent in the 
protection of these rights requires more nuanced normative consideration beyond a 
simple conclusion that harm is bad and ought to be avoided. As discussed above, it 
is beyond the scope of this Article to assess whether the current doctrinal framework 
(discussed in Part III) is normatively justified in every respect. But to the extent harm 
is a useful normative criterion in the First Amendment context, this Article proposes 
three normative questions we should be asking. This Article also provides examples 
of how these necessary normative inquiries are already woven into the legal 
framework that governs many sorts of religious exemptions. 
A. Are Costs Justified by the Social Goods They Provide? 
Professors Schwartzman, Tebbe, and Schragger have argued that it is normatively 
“disturbing” to “forc[e] third parties to pay for the exercise of others’ constitutional 
rights.”305 But this assertion loses its force if someone will always experience a cost 
or harm when government acts to protect, or not protect, any constitutional right. 
Instead, we must broaden our lens to observe harms on both sides of the scale. At 
that point, we can ask the more important normative question related to harm: 
whether net costs are justified by providing a net gain for society.306 
Sometimes localized externalities are arguably balanced by a more diffuse social 
benefit. One might consider the localized externalities resulting from state or local 
taxes related to the support of education in such a way.307 Even families who do not 
have school-age children benefit from having a more educated citizenry and even 
higher property values in their neighborhoods when schools are high quality.308 
Viewing externalities in this cost-benefit context, perhaps the most important 
normative question to ask is whether the cost of a right is a “good deal” for society. 
Where the social goods society receives in exchange for the harm are significant, 
then protection of the right might be deemed a social bargain, notwithstanding 
significant harm.309 
The costs and benefits of free speech provide a particularly salient example of this 
sort of trade-off. Free expression has been justifiably described as a very costly 
right,310 but free expression has also been described as one of America’s “most 
 
 
 305. Schwartzman et al., supra note 10, at 912.  
 306. See HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 139, at 117. 
 307. Thanks to Professor Frederick Gedicks for this example.  
 308. See Gladriel Shobe, Economic Segregation, Tax Reform, and the Local Tax 
(unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with the author).  
 309. HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 139, at 177.  
 310. Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1321–22 
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precious” rights because its protection provides enormous social goods enjoyed by 
society generally.311 These goods include making it more likely that violations of 
other rights will be reported; operating as a precondition for democratic self-
government; ensuring political accountability; decreasing government corruption 
and abuses of power; improving the quality of policy-making; and facilitating a host 
of other artistic, psychological, economic, moral and even religious functions.312 In 
less developed countries, freedom of speech has even helped prevent famines.313 As 
Professor Raz has remarked:  
If I were to choose between living in a society which enjoys freedom of 
expression, but not having the right myself, or enjoying the right in a 
society which does not have it, I would have no hesitation in judging that 
my own personal interest is better served by the first option.314  
In other words, individuals in a society without freedom of expression suffer more 
from the loss of social goods such a society will inevitably experience, than the 
individual would suffer from lacking such freedoms herself and yet living in a society 
that generally protects them. Protection of rights can thus secure goods for 
individuals far beyond those who actually enjoy the rights, which arguably justifies 
the high cost of protecting such rights.  
Freedom of religion has similarly been described as a right which provides a 
significant social bargain to society, notwithstanding its costs.315 This was something 
a number of the American Founders believed. In his Farewell Address in 1796, 
President Washington stated, “Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to 
political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. . . . The mere 
politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them.”316 This 
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argument has contemporary force as well. As Professor Rick Garnett has observed, 
religious accommodation provides a number of social goods even for those who do 
not practice a religion at all.317 One empirical study by Brian and Melissa Grim 
indicates that “[r]eligion annually contributes nearly $1.2 trillion of socio-economic 
value to the U.S. economy.”318  This value can be seen in programs like “130,000 
alcohol recovery programs,” “120,000 programs to help the unemployed,” and about 
26,000 “active ministr[ies] to help people living with HIV-AIDS.”319 Similarly, 
Professors Holmes and Sunstein have argued that one of the most important 
contributions of religious liberty is “peaceable social coexistence,” as this right 
“permit[s] us to be autonomous in our deepest convictions” while still allowing “our 
religiously heterogeneous society to operate passably well.”320 Professor Douglas 
Laycock has similarly recently observed that protecting religious liberty “reduces 
social conflict” and “reduces human suffering.”321 Thus, Americans are willing to 
bear not insignificant costs associated with rights imposed upon them in part because 
a whole range of precious public goods result from the  protection of such rights. 
The social benefits that flow from both speech and religious rights suggest that 
thick protections of these rights are warranted, even if at times costly for society and 
for third parties. These sorts of thick protections are illustrated by constitutional or 
statutory frameworks that require the government to satisfy strict scrutiny and 
demonstrate that it has a “compelling” justification for disregarding speech or 
religious rights. Indeed, this is the standard required under RFRA. But once the 
government can demonstrate a compelling interest, for purposes such as preventing 
otherwise unavoidable significant harm to third parties, then the normative 
explanation is that at this point the cost is too great. Protecting that right is no longer 
a social bargain, and thus other harms outweigh that religious harm. This is the sort 
of normative question—woven into current legal frameworks—that we ought to be 
asking. Yet this is not a question that is relevant under current third-party harm 
theories.  
It is worth noting that definitional issues related to harm under the third-party 
harm theory need not arise in this context, or certainly not with the same acuteness, 
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because whatever definition one chooses to employ for harm affecting third parties, 
one must grapple with how an action will result in that same type of reciprocal harm 
for groups on the other side of the ledger. Further, this normative account does not 
treat the presence of any harm as a condition requiring restriction of any rights. 
Rather, it treats harm as part of an equation that must be weighed in a consistent way 
for government to determine the most socially beneficial intervention. 
B. Can Institutions Be Modified to Mitigate Avoidable Harms? 
Professor Feinberg argues in his classic work, Harm to Others, that some sorts of 
harms arise from “bad social institutions,” meaning institutions that cause conflicts 
that could be avoided, or at least mitigated, if the institutions were modified.322 In 
other words, perhaps much criticism regarding harm lies with a policy or institution 
that puts the rights of religious believers and other third party rights on a predictable 
and easily avoidable clash of harms.  
For example, one of the high-profile contests of harms between religious liberty 
and third-party rights recently arose in the controversial case of Kim Davis, the 
former county clerk in Kentucky.323 After the Supreme Court legalized gay marriage, 
Ms. Davis was unwilling to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Ms. Davis 
was also unwilling to have any marriage licenses issued in her name.324 Her religious 
objections led her to prevent any same-sex couples in the county from obtaining a 
marriage license to which they were lawfully entitled.325 The denial of government 
services for these same-sex couples was a significant harm. On the other hand, Ms. 
Davis was ultimately sent to jail and held in contempt of court because she was 
unwilling to violate her conscience.326 
Other states handled very similar conflicts of conscience in a very different way: 
by modifying their institutions to mitigate harm to both parties. Utah, for example, 
passed a law that would allow clerks to opt out of performing marriages for 
conscience-based reasons, so long as the office ensured that a willing clerk was on 
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duty and available to perform marriages for any couple who requested one.327 One 
need not agree with the policy, or even legality, of such a compromise to 
acknowledge that this sort of institutional modification operated to mitigate harms 
on both sides of the ledger.  
In the context of religious exemptions offered under RFRA, this normative 
question is relevant to the “less restrictive alternatives” portion of the strict scrutiny 
test. Specifically, that prong of the analysis requires courts to look at whether the 
government could still accomplish its interest (which often involves things like 
avoiding harms to third parties) while still avoiding harm to the religious claimant. 
In other words, are there ways to modify institutions or programs so that neither party 
is harmed? This was a particularly salient issue in the Zubik328 litigation, where the 
Supreme Court requested supplemental briefing precisely to require the parties to 
address the question of whether modifications to the religious accommodation under 
the contraception mandate could remove an avoidable harm to both parties.329 
Ultimately, because the government acknowledged that some changes to the program 
were possible, and because the religious claimants indicated that such changes could 
be satisfactory to their interests, the Supreme Court remanded the case to be resolved 
between the parties.330 This is precisely the sort of inquiry that mitigates harm in the 
aggregate and that thus leads to more normatively justifiable results. 
C. Can the Harm Be Distributed More Justly? 
A final important question is whether the distribution of harm is just with respect 
to how benefits flowing from harm are distributed when compared to how the 
corresponding harm is being distributed throughout society. As third-party harm 
theorists have rightly observed, a just society should work to defray costs that are 
disproportionately borne by just a subset of the population. Relying on the work of 
Professor Frederick Schauer, Professors Schwartzman, Tebbe, and Schragger argue, 
“It ought to be troubling whenever the cost of a general societal benefit must be borne 
exclusively or disproportionately by a small subset of the beneficiaries.”331 In many 
cases, a government-funded alternative to more evenly disperse externalities may 
provide precisely the sort of uncoupling of harm that Professor Schauer advocates 
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for. And potential government-funded programs are relevant under the religious 
exemption framework of RFRA. Indeed, this was an important concern for the 
Supreme Court in its Hobby Lobby decision under RFRA’s less restrictive alternative 
analysis portion of the test.332  
The Court in Hobby Lobby noted that the “most straightforward way” of ensuring 
that harms would not be disproportionately borne by third parties “would be for the 
Government to assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue to any 
women who are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance policies due to 
their employers’ religious objections.”333 The Court flirted with the idea that RFRA 
may, at times, require the creation of “a new, government-funded program” in order 
to both accommodate religious exercise and avoid disproportionate harms to third 
parties.334 Some third-party harm theorists have criticized this approach as “not 
politically viable,” which is certainly a reasonable practical concern.335  
However, on June 1, 2018, the federal government proposed a new regulation that 
would expand the definition of “low income family” under Title X to include 
“women who are unable to obtain certain family planning services under their 
employer-sponsored health insurance policies due to their employers’ religious 
beliefs or moral convictions.”336 This proposed rule would ensure that if someone 
actually loses employer-sponsored contraceptive coverage as a result of religious 
exemptions, she will nevertheless have access to “free or low-cost family planning 
services,” including contraceptives.337 This sort of expanded government program 
provides a good example where institutions or policies can be revised so as to 
distribute harm more justly and decrease the magnitude of harm on both sides of the 
ledger. This line of inquiry may be a constructive area where both those who seek to 
avoid third-party harm and those who defend religious exemptions could find 
common ground solutions aimed at dispersing any costs that society must incur to 
reap important social goods through the protection of conscience rights. 
CONCLUSION 
While focusing on harm appears at first to provide an appealing simple and neutral 
principle for avoiding other difficult moral questions, the definition of harm itself 
operates on top of a deep moral theory about what counts as harm and why. 
Consequently, multiple scholars advancing iterations of these theories use “harm” as 
a term of art to mean very different things. This in turn results in scholars talking past 
each other and trading on a superficially simple idea that turns out to be incredibly 
complex. For this reason, the harm principle has proven unworkable in other 
contexts, including criminal and environmental law. This Article highlights the flaws 
of this approach in the religious context by measuring the theory against its own ends, 
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including the theory’s failure to account for harms this approach would cause for 
religious minorities and other vulnerable groups. 
Refuting the unhelpful fixation on the mere presence of generic harm, this Article 
instead describes the nuanced ways in which courts actually classify and weigh 
different types of harm. The categories of harm identified in this Article illustrate 
how courts are always weighing competing harms, which economists refer to as 
bilateral reciprocal externalities. This Article demonstrates how these categories of 
harm are not limited to religious exemptions but are in fact common to all First 
Amendment rights. Further, this descriptive framework sheds light on which sorts of 
harms matter and when, and it highlights the competing harms that always arise when 
any rights are protected. Significantly, by moving beyond a false dichotomy of harm 
versus no harm, we are able to ask much more fruitful normative questions. Such 
questions include whether there is a justifiable trade-off between the specific harm 
and the social goods it provides, whether institutions can be modified to mitigate 
avoidable harm, and whether disproportionate harms can be distributed in more just 
ways. This Article offers examples of how these necessary normative questions are 
already woven into the legal framework that governs many sorts of religious 
exemptions. 
 
 
 
